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INTRODUCTION
THE AUFBAU AND THE GERMAN-JEWISH CLUB
The Early Years
The German-Jewish newspaper AUFBAU-RECONSTRUCTION was the largest,
most long lived and influential newspaper of the German- speaking emigration
to the United States in the Nazi era. From its humble origin in the 1930s
as a newsletter of the German-Jewish Club of New York City, it
developed remarkably into the most important emigre publication during
World War II.
Unlike many papers of the German literary and political exile, the
AUFBAU did not start in the mid-thirties as an antifascist paper with
illustrious names on its editorial board. On the contrary the AUFBAU
was not even a refugee paper when it first appeared in 1934 and for a
2
year it remained sufficiently obscure to slip through Nazi customs.
In its early years it was merely a twelve page newsletter of the German-
Jewish Club in New York City, sent free of charge to all members every
^Another important paper edited and read by refugees was Neue
Volks-Zeitung (NVZ)
,
1932-1948, a sequel of the Volkszeitung , a Social
Democratic weekly originally published by German -American Social Democrats
(1888-1928) . In the thirties and forties the NVZ was edited by Gerhard
Seger and other exiled Social Democrats and read by many refugees as well
as by the old time German-American socialists. Volkesecho (1937-1938)
and The German American (1942-1949) were the publications of the communist
emigration in the United States. The main communist emigre group in
America was in Mexico City and published the Freies Deutschland there
(1941-1945) . Other centers of exile journalism were Czechoslovakia (the
Social Democrats published most of their exile writings there until 1939)
and Paris, where the Pariser Tageblatt , Pariser Tageszeitung , Die Neqg
Weltbuhne
,
and other publications of the literary immigration were edited
until 1940. Source: Exil Literatur 1933-1945, Eine Ausstellung aus
den
Bestanden der deutschen Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main . Auflage
Frankfurt
1967, 3rd edition.
2AU Dec 35, p. 4.
2month. After 1936 it was sold in subscription for five cents a copy
and distributed free to newly arrived refugees from Germany.
3
Until
1939 the paper almost exclusively mirrored the activities of the German-
Jewish Club. This organization had been founded in 1924 by German-Jewish
war veterans who had emigrated to the United States during the 19203.^
The activities of their Club centered upon the preservation and dissemina-
tion of Jewish thought. Announcements of speeches and discussions in
the paper showed that topics related to Jewish culture and religion as
well as subjects in the field of German literature and music dominated
the cultural schedule of the Club. The announcements were conspicuous
for the total absence of American topics and the pages of the AUFBAU
reflected this phenomenon. Although Americanization of the immigrant
became the subject of a more and more lively discussion among Club
members during the mid thirties, this debate was hardly ever enlightened
by any concrete description of life in America. 3
The Club's schedule of social and sports events was varied and
offered many different leisure activities to its members. Sporting
events and, in the summer, outings, hikes, and camps were especially well
received. This part of the Club's activities reflects an affiliation,
which indeed existed, with the principles of Zionist youth groups in
3Will Schaber ed., Aufbau Reconstruction - Dokumente einer Kultur
im Exil
,
New York, Koln 1972, p. 13.
A
Sep 36, p. 1.
5The first articles explicitly on American politics appeared in
1938/39; the 1936 presidential election was only mentioned once. Sep 36, p. 4.
3£
Germany and Austria.
The general emphasis on sports also suggests that most members of
the German-Jewish Club were rather young and came mostly from a middle
class background. The latter impression is confirmed by an analysis
of the early advertisements of the paper. Among the principal advertisers
were members of the Club who offered their services as travel agents,
real estate brokers, accountants, doctors and lawyers.
7
Not too many
intellectuals seem to have been among the original readers of the AUFBAU.
German-Jewish refugees whom Club members contacted in the 1930s were
received with much cordiality. These early newcomers were invited to
take part in the Club's activities and frequently recorded their exper-
giences in the new country for the AUFBAU readers.
As the influx of refugees from Germany and Austria accellerated
,
Club and paper began to focus their attention on this new group of
immigrants. Some branches of the Club developed into specialized
agencies helping the newcomers to establish themselves. In this respect
the Club assumed responsibilities similar to those of the early Jewish
Land smannschaften which had helped Jewish immigrants from eastern
Europe at the turn of the century. The German-Jewish Club thus set up
social service departments where refugees were given general advice and
assistance, and helped financially on a small scale. A legal information
service for those who wanted to secure visas for their friends and
^Dec 34, p. 4.
^AU Dec 26, 44, p.19.
®Jan 35, p. 9.
4relatives was introduced and doctors of the German-Jewish Club treated
needy refugees for lowered fees. Most important of all, the Club
organized a job finding agency which, during the depression, had only
very limited means of helping its clients. Its services expanded
steadily, though, and in 1940 it found jobs for an average of eighty
9
persons a month. The German-Jewish Club, however, regarded the flow of
refugees as only temporary; consequently, the refugee aid facilities
were regarded in the 1930s as emergency measures rather than as an
integral part of the Club's services.^
In those early years the German-Jewish Club was still primarily a
social organization. The most valuable direct aid it could give to newly
arrived refugees was therefore the integration of newcomers into an
already half-Americanized group, where people would talk in a familiar
way about familiar topics, and go for hikes together.
The Formative Years
Only in 1939 did the paper become increasingly independent of the
German-Jewish Club. News about events in Europe became a regular feature
of the AUFBAU and discussion about various aspects of immigration and
life in the United States was started then. The AUFBAU became more and
more the paper of the German refugees in the United States.
The most important formal step toward this development had been the
hiring in 1937 of a regular full time editor, Rufolf Brandi. He was
^Nov 27, 40, p. 14.
l^Sep 36, p. 1.
5replaced in the spring of 1939 by another refugee, Manfred Georg. Both
Brandi and Georg had been professional journalists during the time of
the Weimar Republic. But, in contrast to many other editors of exile
papers, neither of them had gained much fame in Germany. Only under
the enforced provincialism of exile did a journalist like Georg achieve
a distinctive position as an editor and writer who could accommodate
almost all wings of the diversified refugee movement in his paper. Georg
• ,
11
remained editor until his death in 1966.
In 1939 the AUFBAU became a bi-weekly paper and, after December 1939,
it appeared weekly. Its circulation jumped from 3000 sold copies at the
beginning of 1939 to 13,000 at the end of that year, and in 1941 it sold
30,000 copies weekly. It has remained relatively constant at that level
12
until today. Its format changed to regular newspaper size in 1939
and its length increased gradually from 12 to 32 pages.
From 1939 through 1941 the paper grew in importance and influence
in three notable ways. First, instead of relying on the German- Jewish
Club for practical aid to refugees, the paper itself started to assume
the position of a clearinghouse for refugee self-help and political
information. Second, the AUFBAU succeeded in integrating most parts
of the intellectual refugee movement into its pages. At times the
names of the contributors to the paper read like a list of "Who was
Who in Weimar Germany."
13 Third, the paper carried a disproportionally
11Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsch Emigration in den USA , Dusseldorf
1971, p. 127/129
12Dec 22, 44, p. 27/28; Nov 29, 40, p. 4.
13Apr. 5, 40, p. 14.
6large advertising section where the readers could communicate with each
other, ask for help, and offer special services. These three elements
made up much of the unique profile of the AUFBAU from 1939 on.
In the early years of the paper, advertisements were an integral
part of the Club life. Easily identifiable members of the German-Jewish
Club advertised business services, their marriages, and the birth of
their children. In 1939 a regular advertising manager was taken on and
by 1940 over half of the AUFBAU consisted of advertisements and announce-
ments. The advertisements pages featured not only businesses which
mirrored the wide range of refugee enterprises and services, but they
also included classified sections with at least two pages of "for rent"
ads and increasing numbers of "help wanted" listings, as well as family
announcements, search notices for missing relatives, and, after 1940,
even marriage requests in the style of German papers.
From the AUFBAU' s advertisement sections a rather accurate profile
of the paper's readers emerges. Obviously, most of them lived in the
greater New York area. But during the war years the paper noticeably
increased its readership in other parts of the country, and by 1941 it
had readers in most states, especially on the West Coast. Many readers
also advertised regularly from Cuba and from most South and Central
American states. By 1942, 24 countries from Palestine to Australia had
AUFBAU sales representatives. The paper was not only sold by subscription
14
but also on the streets of New York, London, and Jerusalem.
The majority of all AUFBAU readers were Jewish, but the paper's
^Dec 22, 44, p. 28. The editors maintain that the paper is
still
read in 45 countries today, Schaber , op. cit., p. 15.
7audience included the non-Jewish Hitler emigrants as well, and even some
old time German-Americans
.
Although most members of the old German-Jewish Club must have been
rather young, the age level of AUFBAU readers changed as the age of the
average entering refugee increased through the years. This shift was
reflected in the advertisements. In the early years of the paper,
marriage announcements were frequent and almost no obituaries appeared.
In the 1940s deaths were announced as frequently as births, and in today's
paper family announcements consist almost entirely of obituaries.
The readers 1 occupational classes did not change much during the
1930s and 1940s. Most seem to have been business people and skilled
craftsmen. Very few signs of a sizable working class audience or of
upper class readership appeared in the AUFBAU' s advertisement section.
It was this decidedly middle class touch
,
an orientation which
mirrored the middle class makeup of the refugees generally, that made
the paper such an extraordinary and steady success among the emigres.
While the majority of German exile papers circulated only among
intellectuals, the AUFBAU merely made use of the talents of numerous
intellectual refugees. Almost every well known German exile politician
or writer did contribute something to the paper between 1939 and 1945.
This improved the quality of the AUFBAU 's writing and greatly enhanced
its reputation. The majority of its readers surely appreciated being
informed about Thomas Mann's life in exile or reading Franz Werfel's
newest novel. But the intellectuals never dominated the paper in any
15June 13, 41, p. 24.
8respect. They remained contributors, never becoming editors. Not even
in its most successful times did the AUFBAU want to be anything but the
voice of an otherwise silent majority of the refugee middle class.
Although the paper grew more and more independent of the Club,
the Club, like the paper, retained its own definite middle class flavor.
It came to serve as an organizational addition to the paper, rather than
the other way around; but this also included a rapid adaptability of the
Club to the needs of the increasingly numerous refugees. With time,
the Club's social services were considerably extended; and, as the
German-Jewish Club had a number of experienced old time immigrants
among its members, its services always had a personal touch and were
normally very flexible. Except for "Selfhelp" (a social service
organization set up by German refugees in New York City during the
1930s)
,
the German-Jewish Club proved to be the only effective emigre
aid agency set up by refugees themselves. By 1941 it offered a kinder-
garten, free summer camps for needy refugee children, social and legal
services of various sorts, an employment agency, trade union like
groups called Labor Councils, a charity fund (Die Blaue Beitragskarte ) ,
and several Landsmannschaftliche Hilfsgruppen . The latter two were
especially remarkable because they represented two different types of
charity organizations. Die Blaue Beitragskarte was simply a charity
fund to which AUFBAU readers could contribute regularly in order to help
needy refugees all over the world. The Landsmannschaften were formed
after the pattern of earlier Jewish organizations of the same name.
They were founded by refugees from certain parts of Germany
who tried
to help their needy brethren who came from or were still
in their old
9home province. Most visible in the AUFBAU were groups from the southwestern
parts of Germany, especially Baden Pfalz and Wurttemberg, which were areas
where a considerable part of the refugee migration to the United states
,
16
originated
.
The Club increased its membership base considerably during the
early 1940s. The organization's activities did not remain confined to
members in the immediate New York area, but the Club began to cooperate
with similar organizations in Newark, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago. In the fall of
1941, even the German-Jewish Club in Los Angeles, and a little later a
similar organization in San Francisco, started to publish their activities
in the paper and participate in discussion of various issues.
17
The years after 1939 not only brought a definite change in the
quality of the paper's writing and the size of its readership, but
topics and opinions of the AUFBAU also underwent considerable alterations.
Two important new tendencies stand out. First, after Georg became editor,
the paper turned away from decidedly Zionist attitudes and also modified
its earlier opposition to the American Jewish establishment. The
AUFBAU' s opinions became more liberal. Mainstream opinions in American
politics were supported and no explicit anti-communist or anti-Russian
tendencies were visible. The editors' antipathies focussed heavily on
fascism and Nazism during the 1940s. The AUFBAU became known as the
foremost liberal voice of the German- speaking emigration to the United
16
Aug 15, 41, P- 13.
170ct 17, 41, P- 4.
10
States. It underlined this reputation by letting all wings of the
exile movement express their opinions in the paper, Catholic conserva-
tives as well as left wing socialists. Second, this tendency to water
down political differences between the various refugee organizations may
be partly explained by the AUFBAU ' s growing concern with American
domestic affairs and Americanization of the refugee. This implied
rejection of involvement into exile politics. The paper saw the only
chance for a satisfactory social and political future for the refugees
in complete Americanization and a definite turning away from Europe.
Thus by the summer of 1940 the Club had come to the conclusion, "Es
gibt fur die in den Vereinigten Staaten lebenden Juden deutscher
Abstammung im Auganblick keine irgendwie gearteten Bindungen an das
deutsche Reich und der Name German- Jewish Club ist ein Anachronismus
geworden." After six months of deliberation it then decided to change
its name into New World Club in order to emphasize the American
£ L 18orientation of the organization.
But even if the paper was trying hard not to look backwards, it
did have open eyes and ears for events in contemporary Europe. Infor-
mation about refugee movements and war events on the Atlantic front
19
_formed a regular and important part of the AUFBAU. The growing
repression of Jews in Germany, their deportation and, from late 1942,
the news about the systematic extermination policies of the Nazis were
1 8
°At the moment Jews of German extraction who live in the United
States have no ties whatsoever to the German Reich, therefore, the
name German-Jewish Club has become an anachronism. June 7, 40, p. 3;
also Sep. 27, 40, p. 2; Dec. 20, 40, p. 14.
19A regular half to full page feature, "Wanderung und Immigration,"
started in 1941.
11
accurately recorded.
The AUFBAU became one of the most extensive contemporary sources
about these events. The paper had no regular correspondents in occupied
Europe, but it used the services of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, had
correspondents in the free European capitals, and cultivated connections
with several exile governments. Above all, countless readers supplied
the paper with invaluable information they had received from relatives
20
or other personal sources.
AUFBAU and the Unification of the Exiles
The paper and the German-Jewish Club wanted to be more than just
service organizations which would voice the political opinions of the
intellectual exile and other political emigre' groups. One of the
most important characteristics of the German-Jewish Club was that,
within the disparate landscape of the political emigration, it
functioned in a unique way. Unlike many of the small and individual-
istic exile organizations, the paper and the Club took considerable
pains to unite various groups of refugees as immigration increased from
Germany. As early as 1936 the paper advocated the unification of all
liberal German- speaking people in the United States in the Deutsch-
21
Amerikanischer Kulturverband . But this organization, which aimed
mainly at defeating Nazi propaganda and presenting a liberal image of
German culture, never really got off the ground. More successful were
20
Schaber, op. cit. p. 14.
21Jan 36, p. 1.
12
the AUFBAU 's attempts to unite the German emigre's in the American
Federation of Jews from Germany (later American Federation of Jews
from Central Europe). This organization, founded in 1941, became a
rather verbal though only loosely organized interest group. It met
considerable criticism from American Jewish organizations which accused
the federation of German nationalistic tendencies. During the late
war years it became mainly interested in the postwar problems of
22German Jewry.
The AUFBAU, in order to emphasize its independent political role
within the refugee groups, added an advisory board to its organizational
body in 1941. It consisted of a number of famous emigre personalities
and well known Americans who were supporters of the refugee cause. Not
all were Jews; many of them contributed articles to the paper. The
advisory board was therefore more than a mere figurehead; it represented
a serious attempt to integrate part of the intellectual immigration
23into the permanent organization of the paper.
The AUFBAU in the Postwar Years
Unlike any other exile paper, the AUFBAU not only survived the war
years but also continues to exist today. But 30 years after the end
of World War II the function and format are again close to the pattern
of its early days. It no longer speaks as the journal of Germans in
exile, nor has the AUFBAU become a truly American paper as it is still
22
Feb 2, 40, p. 5; Radkau, op. cit., p. 143.
23
May 16, 41, p. 1.
13
edited in German. Indeed, any edition of the AUFBAU today carries
fewer articles in English than the paper did during the war. What
does remain is a very faithful group of readers. These former
refugees who read the paper today use the AUFBAU for finding lost and
displaced persons all over the world. Its readers are also regularly
informed about postwar German politics and the fate of Jews throughout
the world, particularly in Israel. Some of the features and even
some of the editors are still the same as during the war years.
^
Most likely, therefore, the AUFBAU has survived the exile period because
it remained a German paper and could thus retreat again to its early
position as a means of communication for one of the many immigrant
groups in the United States.
0 /
^Schaber, op. cit., pp. 16/17.
PART I. REFUGEES AS A GROUP
CHAPTER I
RHETORIC AND POLICIES OF ANTI
-ALIEN GROUPS
14
General Development
German-Jewish refugees who came to the United States after 1933
were greeted by a wave of anti-alienism in America. This form of
nativism, which had manifested itself repeatedly in American history,
constituted one main obstacle to the assimilation of the refugees into
American society. This prejudice decisively shaped their perspective on
all aspects of life in America as well as their view of their own
position as newcomers. Anti-alienism hampered the chances of many
refugees to settle down comfortably in the United States and to find
economic security and social adjustment. The following pages describe
anti-alienism as it became visible in the legislative and political
actions of the government. But as anti-alienism in a broader sense
permeated all aspects of refugee life, its more hidden forms constitute
a basic theme through most of this study.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the belief was widespread
that America's strength and superiority rested on its ability to absorb
large groups of ethnically diverse immigrants. This school of thought
had traditionally encountered strong resistance from nativist oriented
groups which contended that immigration would have detrimental effects
on American society unless it was regulated and selective. The rhetoric
used by restrictionist groups varied at different times, and it had
different targets in the 19th and 20th centuries. At times nativists
were associated with anti-semitic movements; sometimes they were also
engaged in anti-radical or anti-Catholic propaganda efforts. The core
of their argument remained the same, however; namely, that certain parts
15
of the population, especially some immigrant communities, owed their
allegiance to some un-American cause or power. Alien groups constituted
an uncontrollable and potentially subversive element in American society,
contended the nativists .
^
The key arguments of many restrictionists in the 1930s rested on
the assumption that an uncontrollable mass of immigrants was flooding
the country from Germany and Austria. While proveable figures were not
cited, this sentiment rested on the fact that refugees tended to concen-
trate heavily in certain parts of the country (especially in New York
City, where nearly all of them landed, and where about half remained).
Some restrictionists also suspected that many refugees were coming to
this country illegally or that they were entering on visitors visas
2
with the intention of staying.
To refute these arguments, supporters of the refugees' cause,
especially refugee aid agencies, collected data, including government
statistics, which demonstrated clearly that German and Austrian refugees
were entering the country at a mere trickle and that up to 1938 less
than half the German and Austrian immigration quotas had been filled.
As a matter of fact, the agencies could prove that migration back to
3
Germany was larger than immigration to the United States from Germany.
dohn Higham, Strangers in the Land , New York, 1973, pp. 3-11, chs. 9-10.
deportation of Aliens , Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Immigration, United States Senate, 75. Cong. 1937, p. 88.
^"Admission of German Refugee Children," (Wagner Rogers Bill) Joint
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration, United States
Senate, and a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
House of Representatives, 76 Cong. 1st Session (Apr. 20, 21, 22, and 24, 1939,
pp. 24/25, p. 43; David Wyman, Paper Walls , Amherst 1968, p. 221,
AU July 15,
39, pp. 1/2.
16
But even if only thousands, instead of millions, of refugees came
to America, the restrictionists contended, every job-seeking immigrant
would still either deprive an American of employment or he would be
added to the millions of Americans on public relief. The discussion about
the admission of refugees centered around these two arguments. One
congressman even voiced suspicion that about a million foreigners were
on relief rolls in the United States. The American Legion charged
Jewish-owned department stores with dismissing "100%" Americans in order
to hire refugees. 5 Physicians complained that refugee doctors who
charged lowered fees were flooding the country and depriving them of
6
their clientele.
Here again, refugee aid agencies, especially the American Friends
Service Committee and the National Refugee Service, made determined
efforts to counter these assertions with factual evidence.
As the strains on the job market were easing around 1940, restric-
tionists began to base their rhetoric on the argument that refugees
would bring political insecurity and unrest to the country. They asked
how the American public could know whether the immigrants were true
refugees or potential fifth columnists for the Nazis. At times, not
only the loyalty of the refugees to their new home country was questioned,
but that of the American refugee relief agencies as well.^
^Deportation of Aliens
,
p. 54.
^Wyman, p. 6/7.
^AU March 22, 40, p. 3; Oct. 8, 43, p. 4.
^Wagner Rogers Bill, p. 217.
17
These nativist attitudes, while important to the lives of those
refugees already living in the United States, raised even more problems
when they resulted in direct actions that regulated the admission of
new immigrants from Central Europe. During the Depression, most
potential immigrants to the United States, but especially the less
wealthy refugees, had considerable difficulties in securing immigration
visas. The main hurdle for them was the rigorous screening by American
consular officers abroad who weeded out everybody who, in their eyes,
O
was at all likely to become a public charge. During the late 1930s,
when the refugee problem became more pressing, President Roosevelt
required his consular officers to apply a somewhat more liberal policy
in issuing visas for refugees from Germany and Austria. The president
also began efforts to solve the refugee question on an international
basis in collaboration with Great Britain. But these long range efforts
,
9bore no tangible results.
Thus the executive branch of the government was only partly
successful in its attempt to find a solution that would truly help the
persecuted people in Central Europe and also keep restrictionism at
home within bounds. Congress, meanwhile, was engaged in a series of
confrontations in hearings on immigration and alien legislation. In
1939 the debate between restrictionists and liberals in the House and
the Senate was intensified due to a dramatic increase in the influx of
refugees after the Austrian Anschluss in early 1938 and the German
8Wyman, pp. 4/5; Robert Divine, American Immigration Policy , Yale
Univ. Press 1957, pp. 94/95.
^Wyman, pp. 43ff.
18
Knstallnacht late in the same year. The height of the legislative debate
about the refugee problem was reached during the spring of 1939 at the
hearings on the Wagner-Rogers Bill, a proposal which would have allowed
20,000 German refugee children to immigrate outside of the regular
German quota. Due to the influence of restrictionist groups in Congress,
^ reflection of the strong anti-alien sentiment in the population in
10 11
general, the bill did not pass.
Although the outbreak of the war in 1939 curtailed immigration from
Central Europe sharply, the influence of anti-alien groups in the
legislature did not diminish, but merely took another shape. Refugees
from Germany and Austria were now portrayed as potential spies for
Hitler. The passing of the Smith Act in 1940 reflected suspicion of all
foreigners. It made registration and fingerprinting of every alien
mandatory and also provided for deportation of aliens who were considered
12
to be enemies of the nation.
Internal security laws were further tightened after Pearl Harbor.
Several new regulations restricted the mobility of enemy aliens to
varying degrees. Refugees from Germany and Austria had to have official
permits to travel and they were not allowed to possess cameras or short-
wave radios or to go near military installations. Refugees were also
barred from security related jobs in defense industries. During 1942
strict curfew regulations went into effect in California for enemy aliens
and Japanese Americans.
^Charles Stember et. al., Jews in the Mind of America , N.Y. 1968, p.
^Wyman, pp. 75ff.
•^Ibid
. ,
p. 188
145 .
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The AUFBAU's Reaction to Anti-Alienism
Throughout the war the AUFBAU was very much concerned with the
fact that aliens, and refugees in particular were targets of nativist
verbal attacks and subject to special legal and social restrictions.
Yet the paper showed an astounding inability to discuss and analyze anti-
alienism openly as a sentiment that held an important place in the public
mood. Anti-alienism as a common prejudice among Americans presented a
problem that the paper did not dare to face directly because that would
have meant questioning the much lauded American spirit of tolerance and
,
.
13
equality. Nonetheless, the AUFBAU showed a clear awareness of how
widespread anti-alienism was. This is shown in the countless rebuttals
of anti-alien attitudes and the numerous defenses of the refugees'
position that the paper published. Usually the refugees' cause was
upheld in much the same way that most refugee aid organizations had
14defended it: with statistics and factual reports. In addition,
numerous prominent Americans, including government officials, supported
the refugees in public statements which the paper eagerly printed.
Especially after 1940, such well known personalities as Eleanor Roosevelt,^
the President, himself,"^ Attorneys General Robert Jackson^ and
^\[ar. 8, 40, p. 2; Oct. 11, 40, p. 2.
^Aug. 15, 39, p. 12; May 12, 40, p. 7.
^Apr. 5, 40, p. 3; Nov. 2, 41, p. 1; May 30, 41, p. 1.
16
Nov. 22, 40, p. 1; Jan 24, 41, p. 8; Oct 3, 41, p.4; Jan 9, 41, p. 4;
Apr. 10, 42, p. 3; Feb. 16, 42, p. 6.
17Aug. 1, 39, p. 12.
20
1
8
Francis Biddle, and others warned against an outbreak of anti-alien
sentiment. They called it unAmerican, unpatriotic and unchristian, and
defended the refugees in many other respects. Obviously, the AUFBAU
readers were the last ones who needed to be warned of anti-alienism,
but the paper printed these messages to reassure its readers that some-
thing was being done about a disquieting problem.
If the AUFBAU hesitated to scold Americans for their prejudices,
the paper was certainly not afraid to criticize refugees for somewhat
similar attitudes. Anti-alienism among the refugees themselves was
considered to be a serious problem by the paper. The editors discussed
cases where aliens were falsely denounced as spies by other aliens, and
they warned the refugees not to be overly suspicious of other German-
, . , .
20
speaking people m the United States.
Because the AUFBAU was unable to cope with anti -alienism as a social
phenomenon, it tried to deal with the problem of the status of aliens
through discussion of its legal implications. From the late thirties
on, when the influx of refugees had become noticeable and had caused a
number of legislative measures in regard to new immigrants, the AUFBAU
had regularly carried a great deal of information about visa regulations,
immigration possibilities, and alien legislation. The paper soon
achieved the position of a central information and lobbying agency for
18Nov . 22, 40, p. 1; Oct. 18, 40, p. 1; Nov. 19, 43, p. 1; Oct. 6, 42, p.4
l^E.g., Governor Lehman (New York), July 12, 40, p. 1.
90
March 8, 40, p. 2; Sep. 11, 42, p. 40.
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a more liberal refugee policy and less stringent alien legislation. 21
Before the American entry into the war, the AUFBAU
' s reports about
refugee and alien policy were very factual and hardly ever contained
clear criticism or individual comment. Roosevelt's attempt to solve
the refugee question on an international basis in the late 1930s did
draw favorable comment and its chances of success were appraised
22
carefully. in general, the United States policy towards refugees
was accepted 3 until, in the summer of 1941, the State Department
virtually stopped the issuing of visas and began rescreening all who
had already received them. This move caused serious criticism in
the paper. It was seen as an unnecessary and discriminatory procedure
initiated by an overzealous bureaucracy. Yet no particular individuals
O £
were cited as responsible for it.
Shortly before Pearl Harbor, the low spirits of the refugees in
regard to their legal status rose briefly when the Hobbs Bill proposed
a distinction between refugees and enemy aliens from Germany, Italy,
and Japan. The AUFBAU promptly suggested that refugees should hence-
forth be called "involuntary German nationals," but the Japanese
2 6
attack on Pearl Harbor finished the refugees' hope in this respect.
E.g., information column An Alle (For All) starts Jan. 2, 42, p.6.
220ct . 15, 39, p. 10.
23Jan. 16, 41, p. 12; Dec. 15, 39, p. 1.
2\lyman, pp. 193ff.
23June 20, 41, p. 2; June 27, 41, p . 7; July 4, 41, p.4/5; July 11, 41, p.l
2
^Dec. 5, 41, p. 4; July 17, 42, p. 2; Aug 7, 42, p.l.
22
After the American declaration of war, refugees, more than ever
before, were regarded as enemy aliens and as such were subject to legal
restrictions and public suspicion. In this climate of opinion, the
AUFBAU did its best to appear optimistic and confident, but its
actual feelings of ambivalence were reflected in its articles about the
life of the refugees in the United States. The paper assured its
readers that the label "enemy alien" was merely a technicality without
concrete meaning. 27 It felt encouraged when Attorney General Francis
Biddle proclaimed that loyal refugees did not need to fear any
harassment by government authorities. 28 Biddle also declared that no
regulation barred refugees from working in factories, other than the
few exceptions in the defense industries. 2 ^ Nevertheless aliens had
difficulties in obtaining employment in heavy industries. In many
cases, discriminatory practices against refugees increased during the
30
war. But the AUFBAU continued to wear a relatively happy face,
although, in the atmosphere of continuing anti-alienism, attacks
O 1
against the American foreign language press also increased.
In Spring 1942, just when the paper was confident enough to declare
"Alienfrage kurz vor der Losung" (alien question close to solution)
,
27Jan. 23, 42, p. 1; Feb. 20, 42, p.4.
28Dec . 19, 41, p. 1.
29
Jan. 2, 42, p. 1; Jan. 30, 42, p. 1.
8
^Jan. 23, 42, p. 7; Apr. 13, 42, p. 16.
-^March 20, 42, p. 4; Apr. 24, 42, p. 4; Aug. 28, 42, p. 5; May
28, 43, p. 4.
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controls on aliens became more comprehensive. 32 Aliens residing in
the United States were screened for possible subversive intent by the
Justice Department, and those suspected of disloyal behavior towards
the United States were incarcerated in camps. 33 The AUFBAU tried to
inform its readers about these events in a neutral manner, but the
paper's apprehensions about reprisals against refugees obviously had
not been stilled. The practical effects of most restrictions were not
too harsh, but fears that refugees would be evacuated from coastal
regions and interned in camps were widespread. 3^
For West Coast refugees, these suspicions became a partial reality
when in April 1942 a rather strict curfew was instituted. Enemy aliens
as well as Japanese Americans were forbidden to go more than five miles
from their homes and they had to observe an 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew.
The AUFBAU' s California readers showed considerable bitterness about
these measures, which, they contended, destroyed many important parts
35
of their newly found existence. Enforcement authorities were more or
less openly attacked for their strictness; those refugees who advocated
. ,
36
a patient attitude were a minority. The sudden protest quieted down
33
Apr. 17, 42, p. 1; May 3, 42, p. 1.
33May 15, 42, p. 7; Oct. 23, 42, p. 22; Oct. 23, 42, pp. 1, 3.
3
^May 15, 42, p. 1.
33Feb. 13, 42, p. 1; March 20, 42, p. 1; Apr. 3, 42, p. 17; Apr. 17,
42, p. 17; May 1, 42, p. 17.
36May 15, 42, p. 17, p. 19; June 12, 42, p. 17.
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rather quickly, however, as the measures were lifted on January 1,
1943. 37
Concerning the continuing repression of Japanese Americans, the
AUFBAU showed little understanding. This is quite remarkable, as,
from the outset, Japanese Americans were in much the same situation as
refugees. For no concrete reason, both groups were suspected of being
potentially subversive, regardless of their status as political
refugees or as citizens of the United States. But, somehow, Japanese
Americans were another class of aliens, the AUFBAU maintained. Their
loyalty remained questionable, the bonds of their race, it was declared,
OO
were more important to them than their political allegiance. Thus,
it seems, the AUFBAU not only continued to promote the myth of the
melting pot in face of direct evidence against the openness of American
society, but the paper also accepted some of the nativist’s views, as
they applied to non-German immigrants.
37Jan. 1, 42, p. 5.
3
^March 6, 42, p. 15.
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CHAPTER II
REFUGEES AND ANTI-SEMITISM
Anti-Semitic Movements in the 1930s
Closely connected to anti-alienism both in formal appearance and
in psychological causation was anti-Semitism. The main distinction
between the two on the political level in the 1930s was that, while
anti-alienism as a widespread public prejudice openly influenced
concrete political action, anti-Semitism, though also rampant in
American society, led only a fringe existence in terms of political
impact. If involved in political action, anti-Semitism preferred to hide
in the more rational and respectable costume of anti-alienism.
Groups that had a distinct anti-Semitic appeal were numerous, though
most were small and shared few common characteristics. The majority
came into existence between 1933 and 1938, though some had originated
2in the 1920s like the Ku Klux Klan offshoots in the Midwest. Most
prospered only in the depression years. While an upsurge of activity
occured during the presidential campaign of 1936, the actual peak of
3
organized anti-Semitism was reached in the mid-1940s.
The actual size and structure of the anti-Semitic organizations
are very difficult to determine. They ranged from the millions of
'‘Donald Strong, Organized Anti-Semitism in America
,
New York, 1941,
pp. 146/147.
9
Especially the Black Legion, see David Chalmers, Hooded Americanism ,
Chicago, 1968, pp. 309ff.
^Strong, pp. 146/147.
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passive supporters (listeners) of Father Coughlin's radio speeches4 to
over a hundred small organizations such as the Edmondson News Service. 5
An analysis of supporters of the more sizable and stable anti-Semitic
organizations points towards largely native American, lower-middle
class support. Except for Father Coughlin's National Union For Social
Justice, which claimed to have five million followers in 1939 and which
was the largest anti-Semitic movement, all other groups counted mainly
£
Protestants as their members.
Organized anti-Semitism was concentrated in the Northeastern and
Mid-Atlantic States, in the Midwest, and on the Pacific Coast. It was
most strongest in the urban centers of New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles. ^ But indications are that most supporters of these groups had
a small town or rural background. Gerlad Winrod ' s Christian Defenders,
gfor example, had a decidedly small town Bible Belt following. William
Pelley's "Silver Shirts", the other important Protestant organization,
recruited many of its members from the only superficially urbanized
9
regions of the Pacific Coast.
^Ibid, p. 63.
5Ibid, p. 14, pp. 79f f
.
,
pp. 124-132.
(LDCoughlin claimed five million followers in 1936. A Gallup Poll
counted 3,500,000 listeners to his radio speeches in 1939. Geoffrey
Smith, To Save a Nation
,
New York, 1973, p. 128; Seymor M. Lipset and
Earl Raab
,
The Politics of Unreason
,
New York, 1973, p. 170.
^Strong, pp. 144/145.
®Ibid, p. 76.
^Smith, p. 59; Lipset, p. 163.
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Most anti-Semitic groups had a decidedly native-American background,
with the exception of the German-American Bund which led a somewhat
separate existence for that very reason. Anti-Semitic groups believed
their primary task was to arouse the public about the peril posed to
America's democratic and Christian order, by powerful, sinister forces,
among which the Jews, together with radicals, functioned prominently. 10
Anti-Semitic groups differed in their opinions as to what practical
actions should be taken to halt this threat. Most of their activities
remained rhetorical and most of them were unable to translate their
rabble rousing propaganda into any definite political programs. 11 The
"German-American Bund" and the "Silver Shirts" alone claimed that they
would support a violent fascist takeover in the United States. 12 Public
belief held, though, that in reality still other organizations advocated
a Nazi-style putsch and that some were actively supported by Hitler. 12
With the easing of the depression and the beginning of the war,
the activities of most anti-Semitic organizations declined sharply.
Anti-Semitism as such, though, did not decline among Americans. An
increasing number of people believed, for example, that Jews were an
overly powerful group, especially when economic and financial matters
14
were concerned. Potential support for an anti-Semitic campaign also
10Strong, pp. 163/164.
11Strong, Ch. XIV passim.
12Ibid.
12Ibid., p. 162.
12hIbid., pp. 38/39, pp. 55/56.
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reached considerable intensity in the mid-forties, although Hitler’s
policy towards Jews was rejected by most Americans as too radical. 15
The events of the war itself influenced prejudice against Jews,
who were suspected of being more frequently exempted from the draft and
of trying to evade combat duty. Jews were supposed to be too shrewd
to risk endangering their lives; they were thus seen as a group basically
disloyal to American democracy. 16 This illustrates well the psychological
pattern upon which much anti-Semitic prejudice has been founded through
history. Jews were considered to be cowardly and weak; they would not
stand up for something or defend it openly. Yet this belief was based
upon secret admiration of the supposed Jewish shrewdness. Envy of Jews
who could appear weak and yet preserve their power that way has always
been a major characteristic of anti-Semitism. 17 Refugees in the 1940s
were prime targets for this kind of anti-Semitic thinking.
The AUFBAU and Anti-Semitism in America
The AUFBAU was definitely aware of the widespread anti-Semitism
with which most refugees were confronted, in the United States in the
1930s and 1940s. In numerous articles the paper urged its readers and
the American public not to take the anti-Semitic activities of some
Americans too lightly; unawareness and a lax optimistic attitude had
'“’Charles Stember et al, Jews in the Mind of America, New York
1968, p. 120/124.
16
Ibid
. ,
pp. 129, 134.
17Ibid., pp. 134-140
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cost many Germans their lives or had forced them to leave their
18
country. Yet anti-Semitism was not so much seen as a problem which
hindered the refugees' social integration and acceptance, but it was
considered to be a phenomenon which threatened directly the political
order of the United States. In the eyes of the AUFBAU the most important
and dangerous forces were represented by anti-Semitic organizations.
The anti-Semitic prejudice of Americans in general was seen as less
perilous. The anti-Semitism of such groups as the German
-American Bund
or the Silver Shirts appeared estremely threatening to the paper
because it seemingly developed along the same lines as Nazism had in
Germany; that is, anti-Semitism appeared originally only as a minor
characteristic of movements whose ultimate aim was a violent takeover
19
of the state.
Around 1940 news about the activities of anti-Semitic groups looked
increasingly alarming to the AUFBAU, as organized anti-Semitism seemed
about to grow into a unified movement and appeared to be gaining
-
20
political support. Just as in Germany ten years before, the AUFBAU
asserted, Nazi spies and right wing German-Americans were slowly infil-
trating American right wing movements, and Hitler's Gestapo agents were
more and more successful in using these organizations for their own
ends. The German-American Bund was seen as the major vehicle of these
18Ibid
. ,
pp. 117/118.
^AU June 35, p. 1.
June 21, 40, p. 3.
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systematic activities. 21
But anti-Semitic organizations were not only infiltrated and
supported from abroad, the AUFBAU told Its readers; even some American
politicians were on the side of the American Nazis. "Los Angeles
Nazis Hall Wheeler," and "Anti-Semitism In the Senate - Anti-Semites
and Anti-aliens Gather Around Senator Reynolds," the paper announced. 22
And Colonel Charles Lindbergh's antl-Jewlsh speeches received extensive
23
coverage
.
The discussion in the AUFBAU of anti-Semitism as a widespread
prejudice that confronted the refugees in their everyday lives began
only later, during the war. 24 in 1942 and 1943 the paper commenced
to write about anti-Semitic prejudice in the United States as it appeared
in two main forms: discrimination against Jews by employers, and
physical attacks by anti- Jewish rowdies in a number of large cities.
In all instances the articles were mainly concerned with the illegality
of such acts. With great satisfaction the paper reported the suit
brought against a New York City firm that refused to employ Jews, and it
advocated the establishment of a commission to set up measures to
21Apr. 1, 39, p. 24.
22Apr. 3, 42, p. 3; Dec. 5, 41, p. 7; see also section on German
Americans
.
230ct. 17, 41, p. 15; March 14, 41, p. 9,Sep. 19, 41, p.l;Jan,16, 41,p.l.
2
A
^General appraisals of anti-Semitism: May 1, 39, p. 5; Nov. 13, 43, p. 3.
2
“*Nov. 6, 42, p. 3; Apr. 16, 43, p. 4; Apr. 23, 43, p. 2; Oct. 22,
43, p. 1; Nov. 12, 43, p. 4.
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set up measures to "outlaw” anti-Semitic discrimination in New York
_ _
26
state
.
The more general patterns of anti-Semitic prejudice were only
occasionally discussed from a less legalistic point of view. They
were, however, correctly connected with the climate of fear and
suppressed aggression that was prevalent during the late war years.
The AUFBAU found it remarkable and frightening that Jews were a subject
of discrimination at a time when the country was fighting a war against
the world's prime oppressor of Jews. 22
Even though the paper had not been confident enough to discuss
the prevailing anti-Semitic prejudice in America at an earlier time,
it seems to have been cognizant of its existence in the 1930s. In
order to reassure its readers of its awareness of the problem, and to
show them that this concern was shared by others, AUFBAU published
numerous appeals by government officials and other prominent people
condemning anti-Semitism as something undemocratic, un-American, or
28
un-Christian
.
Besides letting others (all of them Christians!) speak in their
behalf, the AUFBAU' s editors sometimes fought anti-Semitic prejudices
with their own methods. Did Jews control Wall Street? No, said the
29
AUFBAU, and gave statistics about Jewish holdings in major banks.
26Apr . 30, 43, p. 6; Dec 24, 43, p. 4.
22Nov. 19, 43, p. 3.
28Sep. 19, 41, p. 1; Feb. 21, 41, p . 1; March 7, 41, p. !3; Apr. 5,
. 4; March 7, 41, p. 6; July 1, 39, p . 1
.
29Dec. 22, 39, p. 16.
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Nor did Jews control the government to any extent, the AUFBAU asserted
m an extensive report dealing with Jews who had reached high positions
in Roosevelt's New Deal administration. 30 The paper made Jews as a
group as inconspicuous as possible as far as questions of financial and
Whenever questions of active patriotism were concerned, however,
the AUFBAU emphasized the outstanding role Jews played. This especially
came to the forefront during the war years when the paper portrayed
Jews as outstanding soldiers who received numerous awards for their
excellent performance in combat duty. Jewish soldiers were in no way
less active or successful than the rest of "our boys," the AUFBAU
had fulfilled their patriotic duties. Stories about the Jews in the
American Civil War and the first World War confirmed the paper's view
AUFBAU reacted very sensitively to the most serious anti-Semitic
prejudices that confronted refugees in America.
The AUFBAU 's overall perspective on American anti-Semitism was
somewhat split. Up to 1942 it viewed anti-Semitic action mainly as an
3
^Apr. 24, 41, p. 17; Apr. 17, 41, p. 3.
3
-*-David Wyman, Paper Walls
,
Amherst, 1968, pp. 23-26; Zosa Szajkowski,
"The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees," in: American Jewish Historical
Quarterly
,
Dec. 1971, pp. 105-112.
33Aug. 21, 41, p. 1; Oct. 9, 42, p. 1.
33Feb . 27, 42, p. 2; Apr. 10, 42, p. 7.
economic power were concerned. This was a strategy shared by most
American Jewish organizations which had to cope with the refugee problem. 31
Not only in this war, but throughout American history, Jews
of the Jew as an active American patriot. 33 Thus in its own way the
33
essentially foreign movement whose American actors were manipulated by
the Nazis. On the other hand it was much more difficult to deal openly
with the anti-Jewish prejudices and behavior that the refugees encountered
in their everyday lives and which made Americanization so painful and
difficult for them. Like many Jewish organizations, the paper obviously
saw itself in too vulnerable a position to counter this kind of anti-
Semitism with anything but defensive articles and proclamations.
This attitude changed notbaly during the late war years when,
together with American Jewish organizations, the paper began to face
anti-Semitism in the United States in a more open and fundamental way.^
Although the AUFBAU avoided questioning the basic tolerance of Americans
towards minorities, it was able to view anti-Semitism as a very widely
spread phenomenon. This implies that the refugee community had gained
insight as well as confidence during the war years; it was able to see
beyond its immediate problems as a separate group within American Jewry.
^
And, most important of all, refugees in this instance were able to
question society around them, instead of blaming themselves for most
things that interfered with their Americanization.
^The American Jewish Conference, representing a large part of
American Jewry, discussed Anti-Semitism in the United States extensively
in 1943; July 16, 43, p. 16; July 23, 43, p. 1; July 30, 43, p. 13.
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Apr. 16, 43, p. 4.
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CHAPTER HI
THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL IMAGE OF THE REFUGEE
"A lot of immigrants are coming to this country, they have a soft
life and they take over, you can't deal with one and a lot of them are
awful dirty, though they have money."
1
Few sources draw such a hostile
portrait of the refugee as did the person interviewed in Adorno's
study on anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, it was precisely this kind of
image that grew out of the anti-alien and anti-Semitic attitudes and
propaganda so prevalent in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s.
While organized anti-Semitism and anti-alien politics seldom influenced
the refugees' lives as greatly as the personal hostility which they
encountered daily, it must be assumed that confrontations with the
ethnocentric attitudes of many Americans decisively shaped the refugees'
image of their own position in American society, more so than any official
anti-alien policies or discriminatory laws.
Very few printed sources give a clear portrait of the "dirty
o
refugee," as many Americans apparently saw him. Westbrook Pegler, a
right wing journalist whose syndicated column ran in more than a hundred
American papers, and the Hearst Press, especially the New York World
Telegram , ^ did attack the refugees' attitudes and behavior in their
columns at times. But these open polemics were exceptions. More
characteristic of the attitude of the popular press was a LIFE magazine
1
T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality
,
New York, 1948, p. 6'
^AU Jan. 3, 41, p. 7.
O
June 5, 41, p. 4; Jan. 17, 41, p. 9.
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article about "royal refugees" which appeared in December 1940. 4 It
dealt with a number of crowned or formerly crowned families from
Europe who had found refuge from the war in the United States or
Canada. The article supplemented a picture report about British
refugee children in their American foster homes and a list of eight
Rules for Refugees, Royal or Otherwise, While in America." The
accounts about royalty and the British children were friendly enough.
The "Rules," on the other hand, consisted of a mixture of sarcasm
and admonition (see appendix). But, apparently, advice like "Refugees
must not band together in little swarms, chattering and squealing in
their foreign bird talk" touched directly the most sensitive spots in
the relationships between refugees and Americans. At least, not many
refugees or their defenders were able to see this as the joke LIFE
intended it to be. The reaction of pro-refugee groups to LIFE's
"Rules" was very hostile. It is noteworthy in this context that
while the "Rules" were a rather crude joke, the article at large gave a
grossly distorted view of the refugee problem, a fact which AUFBAU did
not criticize. Inasmuch as this was the very first treatment of the
refugee problem in the magazine, information which focussed on exiled
kings and British middle class children (none of them Jewish) was mis-
leading to say the least.
Since the AUFBAU' s foremost goal was to Americanize the refugee
to the fullest extent in his daily life, the paper reacted with almost
4
LIFE, Dec. 16, 40, pp. 89ff.
^Jan. 3, 41, p. 7; Jan. 9, 41, p. 24.
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unprecedented anger to accusations, like those of LIFE, that refugees
were an obnoxious and unassailable lot. The newcomers, the paper
said, were doing their best to become acquainted with the manners and
customs of their new home country and the AUFBAU was doing everything
it could to help them in this process. Anti-refugee polemics, however,
would only undermine such efforts.
Assimilation and learning how to become an American was a process
that should be primarily monitored by the refugees themselves, the
AUFBAU indirectly contended, and consequently the paper itself often
gave hints on how to behave and what to do in order to be more American.
Thus the AUFBAU itself is an extremely rich source of information about
the stereotypic image of the European refugee that many Americans
supposedly had.
To start de-Europeanization, the paper usually advocated a change
in the outer appearance of refugees. Americanization thus literally
often meant an American make-up. Especially on the women's page,
such suggestions appeared often and with detailed instructions. 7 The
suggestions on eliminating any European appearance also included
advising refugees to change their names and handwriting in order to be
less conspicuous in the United States. For the paper the persistence of
a range of behavior which was considered particularly European was also
of much concern. It often advised its readers in rather urgent tones to
abandon such habits as talking German loudly in public or sitting
^Jan. 3, 41, p. 7.
Especially May 31, 40, p. 8.
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y
around in coffeehouses talking in German. 8
The AUFBAU seems rather superficial In putting emphasis on the
Americanization of such characteristics. But the reader could soon
discover that the AUFBAU's stress on such seemingly unimportant habits
such as talking loudly or sitting around In caf^s was ultimately aimed
at changing more fundamental non
-American attitudes of the emigres.
By advising the Immigrant on how to appear as an inconspicuous American,
the paper hoped to break up a widespread tendency of refugees to stick
together, live in the same neighborhoods, go to the same coffeehouses
and restaurants, and behave like any unassimilated ethnic group In
9
New York City. Isolation on the part of certain groups of immigrants
might have been possible in earlier times, but the AUFBAU insisted
that in the case of these refugees the situation was fundamentally
10
different. Unlike any other immigrant group, the refugees could
not muse about the past and foster a memory about the good old home
country. Speaking German for the refugees did not just mean "chattering
and squealing in their foreign bird talk," but it meant using the same
language the Nazis spoke.
To the AUFBAU the Nazis had taken not only property and social
position from German Jews, but also large parts of their historical
8July 19, 41, p. 8; June 27, 41, p. 9; May 31, 41, p. 2; July 19,
40, p. 10; Aug. 23, 40, p. 4; about refugees' bad behavior in a summer
resort at Lake Placid: Oct. 23, 42, p. 6; Oct. 22, 43, p. 28. On
refugee subculture in New York City see Jud Teller, Strangers and
Natives
,
New York 1968, Ch. 4, passim.
^Sep. 27, 40, pp. 3/4.
-*-0july 19, 40, p. 10; May 31, 41, p. 2.
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and cultural identity. A new start in the United States could only be
attempted if the refugee fully realized this fact.
This theory of radical assimilation underlay much of the discussion
among AUFBAU readers about the pro's and con's of speaking German.
Could a German language paper which helped to keep German culture alive
on its pages legitimately ask its readers to give up speaking German?
Neither readers nor editors wanted to change the AUFBAU into an
English paper. And in numerous letters readers expressed the opinion
that writing and talking German with each other was necessary to keep
one's true cultural identity. 11 The AUFBAU itself was not in favor of
this kind of cultural pluralism. It saw its main function as a German
language paper as a temporary help to introduce the refugees gradually
12to the American way of life.
But in other fields that had no connection with the language
problem the AUFBAU chided the refugees for all kinds of non-American
behavior. Most of these accusations had to do with the refugees'
European perception of society, especially with concepts of class and
13
authority that would bring them into conflict with American views.
Men and women, for example, had equal rights and equal duties in
America, the paper told its readers. It was contrary to American
social behavior that husbands should demonstrate any kind of male
supremacy over their wives, just as it was inappropriate for parents
11May 31, 40, p. 2; June 7, 40, p. 9.
^Dec. 19, 41, p. 4.
^Nov. 19, 43, p. 7.
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to inflict a strict and formal discipline upon their children. 14
The refugee at work, or the one who was looking for a job, was
also a frequent target of the paper's Americanizers
. Apparently the
refugees' chances of finding jobs were often reduced by the wrong
kinds of behavior at interviews with prospective employers. The AUFBAU,
as well as the German-Jewish Club, took considerable pains to make the
refugees aware of a few basic rules they had to observe in such
situations. Thus any boisterousness, as well as timidity or shyness,
was criticized. Instead of boasting about past achievements and
experiences, the refugees should show a generally pleasing personality
and the willingness to accept other people's advice. 15 The know-it-all
attitude of some who could not adapt to the differences and changes of
the American system was often the subject of criticism by Americans. 1 ^*
But in many cases the immediate future looked so bleak to the
refugee who wanted to gain economic independence and a better social
status that the boasting about past experience was only too under-
standable. Many were not even able to comfort themselves with the
memories of a glorious past, but instead sank into pessimistic, depressed
states of mind. But the AUFBAU could not even concede that "Kaffee-
hauspessimismus" (coffeehouse pessimism) was a legitimate mood for the
refugees. This paralyzed state of mind would never enable the refugee
to make it in the New World; pessimism was essentially non-American,
14May 17, 40, pp. 13/14.
1
^May 17, 40, p. 13; Jan. 5, 40, p. 3.
16
Aug. 23, 40, p. 9; July 15, 39, p. 7.
40
17
even subversive ("The Flfth Column of Pessimist), the paper 8colded
.
But could a paper which carried extensive accounts of the perse-
cution of Jews in Europe condemn pessimism and anxiety in those who had
narrowly escaped from the concentration camps? Could the AUFBAU
criticize the refugees for speaking German and banding together when
the paper and the German-Jewish Club were parts of an extensive German
emigre apparatus which served many needs of the newly immigrated?
Many AUFBAU readers agreed that the paper was at times keeping an
overzealous watch on the refugees' conduct. In letters to the editor
they advocated that German should not be abandoned by the refugees as
a group, and that it was not fair to accuse them of a variety of non-
American mannerisms just because, as in any group, some of them could
not stop talking about the old times and missed coffeehouses too much.
There were less adaptable people in every group and there was no
reason why the refugees, of all immigrant groups, should be more American
than the Americans in their behavior. 18 But the AUFBAU's attitude
i
towards Americanization remained uncompromising, and the paper showed
even less leniency in this respect during the war years than it had
before
.
What Made the Refugees a Class: the View of the AUFBAU
In the eyes of the AUFBAU, two traits characterized the refugees
as a separate class of newcomers. The most important principle of
^Aug. 23, 40, p. 4; Aug. 1, 36, p. 1.
18Sep. 1, 39, p. 20; Sep. 19, 41, p. 3; Jan 3, 41, p. 7.
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refugee life, which dominated in the AUFBAU's Americanization
ideology, was the need to ban the past from one's memories. The paper,
therefore, sharply criticized the desire to keep German habits alive,
conciously or unconsciously. The second point, the necessity of
leading a purely future-oriented life, was a logical result of this
idea. American society and American customs were to form the exclusive
interest of the refugees, the AUFBAU contended. These two ideas were
the basis of group cohesion and solidarity.
This special way of defining one's own group was remarkable in
many ways. First, it was the exact opposite of what made the refugees
a group for outsiders, who judged refugees by their strange and sometimes
obnoxious behavior. For the AUFBAU, on the other hand, the cohesiveness
of the refugees as a group was based on the assumption that they, more
than everybody else, wanted to get rid of this behavior; group solidarity
was therefore founded on a negative principle. While this negative part
of the refugees' self-definition remained clear at all times in the
paper, Americanization, the great positive uniting goal of all refugees,
was always a cloudy, undefined term. The AUFBAU's advice on how to
become American hardly ever got beyond the do's and don't 's in every-
day situations. Beyond this pragmatic advice the nature of American-
ization was not described in any substantial way. Just as the feelings
of most immigrants towards their new homecountry were unclear their
views of American society as a whole were fractioned as well.
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CHAPTER IV
HOW DID THE REFUGEES FIT INTO THE AMERICAN CLASS SYSTEM?
The historian is confronted with an extraordinary phenomenon in
the study of the Americanization of the refguees. They had neither a
definite image of themselves, their cultural background, and their
actual social position as a group; nor could they envisage their
future as Americans in any concrete terms within the framework of
American society. Their means to build up a feeling of cohesiveness
were very limited and mostly based upon a shared negative experience.
And yet, never before did a minority group of immigrants reach such a
high degree of assimilation within one generation. In order to find
out why this was so, one has to consider the social background of
German-Jewish refugees and understand their conception of America's
social order as shaped by their group experience.
Most historians of the refugee movement agree that the greatest
difference between the Hitler refugees from Germany and Austria and
most other immigrant groups in American history was the high educational
and social position the former group had held in its home country.^
The difference in occupational and social background was especially
striking if one compared the refugees, as many Americans did, with
Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who had come to this country in
the early 20th century.
^Maurice Davie, The Refugee in America
,
New York 1948, p. 132;
also Kurt Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee
,
New York 1944, p. 372.
43
The origins of the differences between these two groups of Jewish
immigrants are to be found in the different historical development in
,
Eastern Europe and in most parts of Germany in regard to the position
of Jews. Jews in Germany, unlike those in Eastern Europe, gained
considerable social and economic mobility during the nineteenth century.
Up to 1930 no open persecution of Jews had occurred in Germany for
more than a hundred years. In the wake of the political reforms
influenced by the Enlightenment and the various revolutions of the
mid-nineteenth century, some German states granted Jews a legal status
equal to that of Christians. A small Jewish elite was even permitted
to participate actively in the cultural life of the cities. Its
members attended literary and musical salons and some of them became
well known artists themselves. By then, some Jews had also begun to
participate in the democratization of German states; some of them on
the side of the revolutionaries, some as reformers.
^
It became the declared aim of the emerging Jewish middle class in
Germany to attain the recognized social position of this small elite.
Seemingly the most successful way to reach this goal was to get rid
of all attributes that were traditionally associated with Jewishness.
Thus language and religion ceased to be distinctive features of German
Jewry; many families converted to Christianity."^
When the Nazis began to classify all Jews as non-Aryans after 1933,
for the first time in their lives many Jews became aware that they were
^Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
,
new ed., New York
1973, pp. 56-68.
"^Ibid
.
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supposedly different from the rest of society. Being a Jew suddenly
meant being a non-person without the right of a respected place In
society. Under the Impact of the policies of the Nazis, a conception
of one's Jewishness In any positive terms was even less possible than
before
.
Thus, long before their arrival in the United States, most German-
Jewxsh refugees had developed a largely negative view of themselves as
a group. They had experienced an extreme and sudden uprooting of their
seemingly intact cultural identity, and, by the time of their arrival
in the United States, they were thoroughly disconnected from the old
as well as the new world. Was complete Americanization, as the AUFBAU
advocated it, possible on this shaky basis? Or were there more
realistic alternatives to total assimilation?
As the history of American immigration clearly shows, the assimila-
tion of immigrant groups usually took place within two or three generations
The starting point for Americanization was in many cases a rather self-
contained social structure built up among ethnic groups. Every member
of an immigrant group would find his special place within the class
order in this ethnic community. Once achieved the ethnic framework
also provided the immigrant with a set of cultural and social values
that would gradually become more Americanized from generation to
4generation
.
It is obvious that this gradual approach to assimilation via
ethnicity did not present a viable way of Americanization for these
^Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life
,
New York, 1964, chap. 6
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refugees. Not only were refugees unable to see themselves as an ethnic
'
group, in any positive terms, but a paper like the AUFBAU was also
largely unable to perceive the importance and value of ethnic affiliation
in American society. 5 The refugees can therefore be regarded as an
essentially new group of immigrants which acquired few of the traditional
characteristics of previous immigrant groups.
Nevertheless, for immediate help and adjustment the refugees,
consciously or not, turned to that American ethnic group to which they
felt closest and which in turn offered the most helpful assistance,
the American Jews. The American Jewish community, however, was not
only one of the largest, but also one of the most fractioned, ethnic
groups in the United States. Only those refugees whose allegiance to
a certain part of American Jewry was predetermined had no further
difficulty in joining American Jewish organizations. Thus German
-
Jewish Zionists could readily become members of American Zionist
organizations
. Likewise, the religious Jews did not encounter too many
obstacles in participating in the activities of Reform or Orthodox
congregations in the United States.
As far as the rest of American Jewish organizational life was
concerned, ready participation in their activities proved much more
difficult for the refugees. In most organizations that were involved
in large scale political or charitable efforts, they would encounter
^A few references to the "Melting Pot" and the idea of "Cultural
Pluralism" appear in AU June 7, 40, p. 9; Nov 22, 40, p. 3; Apr 24, 41, p. 9.
(L
Alexander Carlebach, "German Jewish Immigration and its Influence
on Synagogue Life," in Leo Baeck Yearbook 1964
, pp. 355-359.
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the old rivalries between Eastern European Jews (relatively recent
immigrants) and German Jews (who had come to the United States in the
middle of the nineteenth century)
. The latter were mostly middle and
upper middle class people who had traditionally held the leading
position in the American Jewish community. But by the 1930s they had
lost much of their former predominance in American Jewish organizations
to Jews of Eastern European extraction.
Not only were the refugees caught in the quarrels between these
two groups, but this conflict rervived some of the same ethnocentric
bias towards "Polish" Jews that had prevailed in Germany in the past.
There, just as in the United States, Eastern European Jews had been
considered an uneducated proletarian class, much looked down upon by
the more middle class "Germans." Apparently some refugees warmed up
their latent prejudices in the United States, even though they were
dependent upon the help of this very same group.
^
One other ethnic community that could have given assistance to
the refugees in their Americanization efforts were the German -Americans
.
This possibility did not look very attractive to the refugees, however.
Although German Americans and German-Jewish refugees shared the language
and much of the cultural tradition of Germany, there was more hostility
than interaction between the rather conservative German -American community
and the refugees. Only German socialists (old time immigrants of
the Bismarck times as well as socialist emigres of the 1930s) shared the
^AU Apr. 15, 39, p. 5; Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsche Emigration in
die USA 1933-1942, Dusseldorf 1972, p. 137.
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position as social and political outcasts with the Jewish refugees.
For this reason the latter groups had rather close contacts with each
other
.
**
The only segment of society that was ready to help German-Jewish
refugees, other than American Jews, was the American intellectual
community. This was not an ethnic group in the basic sense in that
its main forms of cohesiveness did not rest upon similar religious
beliefs or a common cultural heritage. American intellectuals were
the social groups that had dissented from the ethnic frames that
divided the rest of society. 9 Their values and their ways of life
were rather close to those of many European intellectuals. As a sizable
number of German Jewish refugees were teachers and scientists, or
professionals and artists, they received considerable assistance from
American intellectuals. But the aid of the American intellectual
community was not entirely separate from the activities of other refugee
aid groups, as many intellectuals were involved in assisting the
refugee through various religious organizations and governmental action.
In the pages of the AUFBAU the problem of ethnicity received
minimal attention in connection with assimilation of the refugees. The
paper apparently did not consider ethnicity to be a vital part of the
Americanization process. The reason for this was clearly the result
of the refugees' inability to conceive of themselves as an ethnic group.
Therefore they were also unable to see that ethnic structures made up
^See section on German-Americans
,
p. 6, esp. footnote 24.
^Gordon, pp. 224ff.
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the dominant framework of American society as a whole.
The refugees, as the AUFBAU represented them, were much more
concerned with the fact that most of them had suffered a loss of
status, at least in terms of their European class conceptions. Most
refugees in the United States were forced to start at a working class
level, performing unskilled manual labor for a livelihood. The
chances and opportunities to leave this humble starting position and to
move up into the white collar property-owning class were the dominant
concerns' of the refugees. 10 Any discussion of one's social values and
one's position in American society took the most concrete shape in the
paper where questions of work were concerned. The refugees thus simply
escaped the conflicts they would have faced had they placed themselves
in an ethnically divided society. They retained their European point
of view that what mattered was simply the social class one belonged to,
which in turn would be determined through the work one performed. But
did this seemingly simple solution really work? Did it help the
refugees to face the reality of their lives as working people?
10See chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V
REFUGEES AND THEIR WORKING EXPERIENCE
It was one of the most crucial and cruel coincidences that at a
time when thousands of refugees wanted to come to the United States,
eager to build up a new life and to obtain a new dignity working their
way up the economic and social ladder, the United States was in a
severe economic crisis with millions of Americans unemployed. During
the depression years prospective immigrants were therefore confronted
with an extremely restrictive admission policy, one which kept immigra-
tion at a minimum in order to prevent competition for jobs with
unemployed Americans. The Roosevelt administration attempted to
modify this policy as the plight of the refugees from Europe became more
urgent. But restrictionist groups, which argued that refugees should
not be admitted in any substantial numbers as they were likely to
displace American workers or become public charges, gained more and
more support among the population in the 1930s.
1
Throughout the mid-
thirties the government's refugee admission policy remained so restric-
tive that up to 1938 the German and Austrian immigration quotas had
been less than 50% filled.
^
Refugee aid organizations, confronted with the rising tide of
anti-alien sentiment, made concentrated efforts to refute the unemploy-
ment arguments of the restrictionists
. Thus Refugees at Work
,
a
statistical study edited by Sophia Robison and sponsored by several
^David Wyman, Paper Walls
,
Amherst, Massachusetts 1968, pp. 6/7.
^Ibid.
,
p. 221
.
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refugee organizations, tried to prove that a considerable number of
refugees were not workers but entrepreneurs who succeeded in establishing
their own independent businesses within only one or two years of their
arrival. These newly founded shops and small factories not only
provided jobs for many Americans, but also stimulated the American
economy in general and introduced new goods and manufacturing methods
to the American scene. Similarly, the National Refugee Service, in its
brochure Dividends from New Americans
,
argued that many refugees from
central Europe brought with them very special skills as manufacturers
of specialties or as highly qualified craftsmen and, far from increasing
competition, would actually stimulate the American economy.^ Other
statistical reports emphasized the fact that the number of refugees as
a whole was much too small to contribute significantly to the unemploy-
ment figure, and, besides, only half of the incoming refugees were
potential wage earners at all (the other half were children or older
people). Of those who were employable, about 75% were completely self
sufficient and only 17% received any assistance from refugee aid
5
organizations
.
The AUFBAU joined the defenders of the refugee cause and tried to
prove the usefulness of the new immigrants in several ways. Kurt
Grossmann in a programmatic article in 1940 discussed the main arguments
summarized above, and added that, while only about half of the refugees
3Sophia Robison, Refugees at Work
,
New York, 1941, pp. 37-52.
^Dividends from New Americans
,
National Refugee Service, New York
1941, pp.1-5.
^Maurice Davie, The Refugee in America
,
New York, 1948, pp. 136-137.
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were working, all of them were consumers who would stimulate the economy
through their demands for goods. 6 In several other Instances the paper
argued that throughout United States history Immigration had always
been to the nation's benefit In the long run. This thesis was emphasized
by numerous biographical accounts of German Jewish businessmen who had
come to this country In the 19th century and established thriving
businesses in the New World.
7
other stories pointed out the important
roles of many refugees as pioneers in business or inventors of new
products or manufacturing processes.
8
In 1939 and in 1940 the paper
began to publish two regular columns entitled Wir geben Arbeit (We
provide jobs) and Wir bauen auf (We are establishing ourselves)
,
where
the names of refugee employers and newly founded refugee businesses
9
were listed.
No way exists to determine whether the efforts of refugee agencies
to defend the usefulness of the new immigrants from Europe had any
impact upon the attitudes of restrictionist groups. The number of
refugees admitted in 1938/39 increased considerably over the previous
year, but this fact was probably due solely to the mounting pressure of
the crisis in Europe. 10 The efforts of the AUFBAU itself certainly had
Slay 17, 40, p. 7; also Aug. 15, 40, p. 12.
7
May 31, 40, p. 8; Dec 27, 40, p. 8; Apr 11, 41, p. 3.
Slay 3, 30, p. 16; Nov 1, 40, p. 6; Aug 13, 43, p. 28; Sep 24, 43, p. 32.
9Sep 15, 39, p. 26 and following issues irregularly
10Wyman, p. 221.
52
after their arrival: first, they had to secure some kind of job in
order to be able to maintain themselves. Secondly, after they had
found work, mostly in unskilled, low paid positions as domestic
servants, door to door salesmen, or menial workers, they would begin to
concentrate their efforts on reaching a position where they could make
use of their original skills and their European experiences in some way
Both problems, finding a job immediately and working towards reaching
one's former social and occupational status, were of central concern
to the paper and to the Club, as they tried in many ways to help the
re fiigees in accommodating themselves occupationally.
The most important service for the newly arrived refugees was
the German-Jewish Club's employment agency. This office existed in
rudimentary form as early as 1934, but it expanded so quickly in the
following years that by 1940 it could offer 80 placements to about 100
job
-hunting refugees each month. The paper also opened a free
advertising column for sales representatives who were looking for new
clients. Paper and Club gave general advice about the structure of the
job market: what jobs were in demand, where to ask for work, and how
11
Nov 27, 40, p. 14.
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to apply. 12
In its efforts to find jobs for newly arrived refugees, the German-
Jewish Club (by then called the New World Club) also cooperated with
other refugee agencies, some of which had extensive job finding and
job training programs. 13 The National Refugee Service (NRS)
,
a
central refugee aid agency, founded and sponsored by American Jewish
organizations in 1939, played a primary role in assisting the new
immigrant in this respect. It, for example, found work for almost
10,000 newcomers between 1930 and 1940 (however, almost 7000 refugees
were looking for jobs in 1940 alone. 14 This organization operated
throughout the country, cooperating with local committees which
regularly engaged in systematic job soliciting efforts. 13 The American
Friends Service Committee, a Quaker relief organization, also located
jobs for refugees and organized a "man marketing service" which advised
refugees on how to go about finding a job, how to fill out applications,
16
and how to behave at interviews.
12 . ,First issue of salesmen column, Dec 27, 40, p. 4; about doctors:
Apr. 1, 39, p. 5; Aug. 15, 39, p. 15; Dec 5, 41, p. 10; Jan 23, 42, p.*4;
March 22, 40, p. 10; nurses: Feb 9, 40, p. 5; June 20, 41, p. 12; lawyers
and accountants: Feb 23, 40, p. 9; musicians: Oct 15, 39, p. 19.
13
Dec 8, 39, pp. 3/4; March 6, 40, p. 10; March 16, 40, p. 5;
March 29, 40, p. 14; May 1, 39, p. 4; March 8, 40, p. 6; Nov 22, 40,
p. 14; Aug 15, 39, p. 15; Apr. 29, 41, p. 5.
14
NRS Annual Report
, 1939, p. 8; 1940 , p. 7.
^NRS, Community Service Releases
,
I, July 25, 40, CSR; XV, May 21,
42, part 2.
16American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Bulletin on Refugees
Abroad and at Home, No. 13, Dec 9, 42.
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The publications of these refugee aid agencies provide considerable
insight into factors influencing unemployment among refugees. The
main problem lay in the fact that about two thirds of all adult male
refugees from Europe had formerly worked in some kind of white collar
position. Among German and Austrian refugees, the percentage of people
whose skills were usually of little use to them in the United States was
likely to be even higher. 17 Only the few skilled workers, and especially
the craftsmen, had no difficulties in finding jobs and accommodated to
the economic situation rather quickly. Women also generally had a
much better chance of immediate employment than men. In many cases
they were the only supporters of their families for a while, working as
domestic servants, governesses, or cooks.
18
Age was another important
factor influencing the chances of employment. Male refugees over 45
years were among the most disadvantaged job seekers. As the average age
of refugees increased steadily from 1939 throughout the war, this became
a serious problem for all refugee aid agencies, a problem which was
only temporarily solved through the war boom. 19
The AUFBAU's columns only very indirectly reflect these facts about
the structure of unemployment among refugees. It is therefore
difficult to derive much of a picture of the employment conditions of
most readers from the paper itself. But, from the Club activities and
the advertisements and announcements in the paper, one can conclude that
^NRS Annual Report, 1939
,
p. 6.
^Robison, pp. 68/69; AU Nov 22, 40, p. 14.
~*~ 9NRS Annual Report, 1940
,
p. 12; 1941 , p. 7; 1942
,
p. 10.
55
many of its readers must
and small business-people
have been professionals, semi-professionals,
. Few teachers and intellectuals seem to have
joined the German-Jewish Club.
As most of these occupational groups had a relatively low trans-
ferability of skills, they needed considerable and systematic assistance
by refugee aid organizations to readjust themselves occupationally.
The AUFBAU tried to share this burden with the major agencies. The
paper printed numerous articles, letters, and analyses concerning (1)
the adjustment and assimilation of professionals; (2) the establishment
of independent refugee businesses; and (3) the retraining and resettle-
ment of refugees. Each of these three categories merits careful
analysis
.
(1) Professionals and semi-professionals usually had a good chance
to secure employment in their former kind of position once institutional
obstacles were overcome and the refugees had acquired some knowledge of
their field in the United States. The paper therefore saw no need for
complete retraining for a different occupation. The AUFBAU envisioned
its main task as providing information about the general situation in
professional fields, specifically the legal restrictions concerning
practicing doctors, nurses, lawyers, and public accountants. 20
The German- Jewish Club organized a number of special subsections
which were specifically concerned with the occupational readjustment of
several groups of professionals. By 1941 there was a doctor's group,
as well as groups for lawyers, teachers, and laboratory assistants;
20
See Footnote 12.
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all of these published their activities regularly In the paper. 21
Paper and club devoted more space and Interest to professionals
than to any other occupational group, although the majority of the
AUFBAU readers definitely did not belong to this category. Furthermore,
although professionals comprised only a minority among refugees as a
whole, other refugee aid organizations centered many of their activities
around this group as well. The National Refugee Service, for example,
organized special committees to aid emigre rabbis, musicians, and
physicians. Affiliated organizations existed for displaced scholars and
.
. 22
social workers. The American Friends Service Committee made special
efforts to help intellectuals, especially teachers and research
23
scientists
.
There are a number of reasons why the various institutions cared
so much about intellectuals and professionals. First of all, this
group definitely needed special assistance to adjust occupationally;
and, as most refugee professionals were highly specialized, a complete
retraining would have been a waste of their skills. On the other hand,
these refugees obviously represented a very desirable class of
immigrants. Many refugees clearly came from the intellectual elites of
their home countries, and many supporters of refugees, as well as
United States officials, felt that every possible move should be made
Weekly (doctors) or monthly or irregularly (others) in the
advertisement section of the paper.
22Davie, pp. 134/135. For a survey on professional organizations
see Lyman White, 300,000 New Americans
,
New York, 1957, p. 400.
^AFSC, Bulletin No. 4, Jan 20, 42; No. 13, Dec 9, 42;
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4
to integrate them into American academic and professional life.
(2) The establishment of independent
important part of the paper's educational
businesses was also an
efforts to promote refugee
adjustment. Sophia Robison's Refugees at Work indicates that most of
the businesses founded and operated by refugees in the New York City
area were small scale enterprises. Many were small retail stores in
the Midtown and upper West Side sections of Manhattan. 24 Some refugees
had succeeded in transfering larger amounts of money before they had
left Germany, and had started manufacturing on a larger scale. Others
used international connections they had established in Europe to help
build import or export businesses. A great number of enterprises
catered mostly to refugees: specialty stores, groceries, restaurants,
and even some hotels. Others introduced goods into the American market
that had previously been unknown or had to be imported from Europe,
like leather products or harmonicas and other musical instruments.
Other businesses, such as those in the garment industry, faced few
difficulties adjusting to American market conditions. 25
The AUFBAU reflected the rapid development of an ethnic group of
refugee businesses in its announcements and advertisements of newly
opened refugee ventures that were, for the most part catering mainly
to other refugees.
(3) Yet for countless new immigrants who had formerly been employed
as managers, bank clerks, or marketing experts, no easy way existed for
0 /
^Robison, p. 40, p. 50; Dividends from New Americans
,
pp. 4/5.
^ 5Ibid.
,
pp. 41-52.
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fitting into the American economic system. Because many of them were
still working in low paid menial jobs in 1941, the National Refugee
Service decided to retrain some of them completely for jobs as skilled
laborers or craftsmen in job categories that were badly needed by some
industries. Retraining courses were first held in New York; but soon
afterwards similar programs were started in Pittsburgh, Cleveland,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and many other cities. The schooling, which
was free, was usually held at local trade schools. It lasted from four
weeks (for retraining as domestics) up to six months and longer (for
dental technicians and upholstering, for example). Most successful
were the courses held in power sewing machine operating, like earlier
generations of Jewish immigrants, refugees were thus often employed in
the garment industry. The courses in furniture finishing and upholstering
26promised a stable and rather high income.
The AUFBAU greatly approved of the NRS retraining program and it
sponsored similar courses in 1943. Both the paper and the Club put
strong emphasis on the permanent employment that retraining in such
skills as upholstery, jewelry, or furniture finishing promised. They
emphasized these kinds of courses in their information about retraining
and were less attracted by the get-rich-quick philosophy that apparently
27
underlay the NRS sewing machine or welding courses.
Much more enthusiastically welcomed by the paper were the efforts
of the National Refugee Service and many other aid agencies to relocate
26NRS, CSR, Nos. 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 22.
^AU May 8, 42, p. 5; Jan 22, 43, p. 20.
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refugees fro. New York City into other parts of the country, m
numerous success stories by and about resettlers the paper conveyed to
its readers that through relocation the refugee gained the chance to
find a job where his European skills and experience would be of some
use and where he would consequently soon find himself in a permanent
2g
and secure position.
This impression stood in some contrast to the results of the
resettlement process of most refugees. As the publications of the
various agencies engaged in resettlement work point out, more than a
mere geographical relocation of the refugees and their families was
needed to make resettlement a success. In most cases the chosen
communities had to be matched carefully with the refugees' wishes, and
in many cases it was not easy to secure jobs for resettled refugees.
Thus the critical situation of many refugees was not alleviated merely
by relocation. As the success of the NRS retraining courses in many
cities outside New York shows, retraining was something many refugees
had to go through in addition to resettlement.
Indirectly, the paper reflected these complications in numerous
stories about refugees who had (re) settled on the West Coast. The
reader learned how they earned their living as taxi-cab drivers, dog
groomers, van movers, or restaurant cooks. In these stories about life
on the Pacific Coast it never became entirely clear for what reason
former middle class people would turn to such unusual occupations.
28july 21, 44, p. 14; Oct 13,
42, p. 15; Dec 11, 42, p. 15.
^July 2, 43, p. 13; March 5,
44, p. 15; Oct 20, 41, p. 27; Feb 20,
43, p. 14; Oct 2, 43, p. 15.
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Was it the lack of alternatives that made
or was it on the contrary the promise of a
an actor into a cab driver,
high salary and the challenge
to do something different that made former lawyers work in the ship-
yards and housewives into professional cooks? 30
Coast refugees In the AUFBAU give the impression
liked their new jobs but none of them expected a
The reports from West
that almost all readers
permanent new position
from it.
The only instance in which retraining and resettlement were definitely
and systematically used for attaining some permanency for the refugees
was through the introduction of some newcomers to farming. The Jewish
Agricultural Society of the United States took a decided interest in
resettling refugees from central Europe to the American countryside, in
training them in farming, and in helping them establish their own farms.
The AUFBAU began to publicize the activities of this organization as
early as 1938, consistently showing them in a very favorable light. 3 ^
In 1940 the paper even published a regular column, der Landwirt (the
farmer)
,
for some time. The paper pointed out to its almost exclusively
urban readers how formerly depressed, unemployed, and isolated urban
businessmen had found material and spiritual independence in farming,
thus fulfilling a part of the American dream from which Jews had
32
usually been excluded. As a whole, however, the idea of resettling
on farms was not too attractive to most refugees; only 2500 of them had
30
Oct. 13, 44, p. 44; May 6, 43, p. 12.
31Feb 22, 40, p. 11; Aug 9, 40, p. 3.
3
^Sep. 1, 39, p. 9; Feb 9, 40, p. 1; July 26, 40, p. 2; Apr. 11, 41, p. 3.
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chosen to live on farms by 1941.^
Refugees who became farmers, the AUFBAU suggested, truly conquered
their new home country through hard work and literally succeeded In
building up a new existence and future with their own hands. Whether
this was true also for the many other immigrants who had to perform less
dignifying work is highly doubtful. The refugees' own stories about
their experiences do not tell much about their relationship to their work
Most of these stories reflected the thoughts of inexperienced newcomers
who were more excited by the strengeness of Americans and the American
way of life than with the job itself, which usually offered few
original experiences. 3^ Identification with their work as a fulfilling
and dignifying experience was voiced only by refugees who had gone
through retraining courses or by those who worked in the defense
35industries
.
Rather striking was the lack in all these accounts of any informa-
tion or opinions about American fellow workers. Apparently, for most
refugees working was an isolated rather than a socializing (or
Americanizing) experience, a fact underlined by the publications of the
<5 r
American Friends Service Committee. Language difficulties were an
important part of this deplorable isolation. In many cases American
3
^White, p. 55.
34
,Column Crosstown starts May 1, 39, and appears regularly for 6
months; also Feb 9, 40, p. 10; March 22, 40, p. 5; June 28, 40, p. 11;
Jan 3, 41, p. 18; March 22, 40, p. 16.
33Aug 8, 41, p. 19; Oct. 2, 42, p. 15; Nov. 21, 41, p. 8; March 20,
42, p. 32.
Of.
Esp. AFSC
,
Bulletin
,
No. 14, May 12, 43.
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trade unions refused to admit refugees, which prohibited not only
occupational adjustment but probably social contacts as well. 37
The AUFBAU made conscious attempts to alleviate this situation
for the working refugees, in spring 1940 Siegfried Aufhauser,
notable German emigre' labor expert and member of the Social Democratic
party, began to write a regular column. Review of Labor
, where the
peculiarities of the American trade union system and labor legislation
as it applied to the refugees were discussed. Aufhauser also
published encouraging reports about refugees who had joined or
organized union locals successfully. 38
But these signs of emancipation and structural assimilation of
the refugees as workers were apparently rare. Many middle class
refugees who had to work in blue collar jobs before and during the war
were probably not interested in labor organization at all. They did
not wish to give their working class positions the look of permanency.
Many refugees also felt a genuine frustration as dependency on
institutional aid and a general economic and psychological insecurity
prevailed in their lives. Even the optimistic AUFBAU had to face these
somber realities from time to time. Especially in the 1930s and the
early 40s the paper had frequently to discuss the generally depressed
state of mind of the immigrants. A number of refugees who felt that
3
7
Feb 9, 40, p. 2.
3®March 7, 41, p. 5; Nov 1, 40, p. 8; Nov 22, 40, p. 14; Feb 9,
40, p. 2 are some early examples.
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they were able no longer to face the hardships of social readjustment
even committed suicide, the paper reported. 39
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CHAPTER VI
PATTERNS OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT: CITIES AND THE COUNTRYSIDE
A very real dilemma that faced the AUFBAU and most refugee
organizations arose from the fact that about half of the refugees
chose to stay in New York, their port of entry.
1
The city attracted them
mainly because of its European way of life. Numerous ethnic groups
that lived there offered a halfway station to Americanization for
immigrants from many parts of Europe. On the other hand, employment
possibilities and the general outlook for assimilation to the American
social system were in many ways extremely unfavorable in New York City.
Still, many refugees stubbornly refused to move for fear of being
completely isolated elsewhere and deprived of any possibility of
maintaining contacts with fellow immigrants.
The AUFBAU itself reflected this dilemma very acutely, as the vast
majority of its readers lived in New York City. Extensive parts of
the paper were devoted to life in New York, its enjoyments and problems.
Newly arrived refugees from Germany were usually pleasantly over-
whelmed by New York's glittering facade and its seemingly unlimited
possibilities for the newcomer. Suddenly the depressed and dreary life
in the urban centers of Europe were only bad memories and America's
O
shiny cities were the overwhelming reality. As one refugee child said:
"There are so many lights, like a birthday cake, red, blue, yellow, and
^Maurice Davie, Refugees in America
,
New York, 1947, p. 80.
^Lyman White, 300,000 New Americans
,
New York, 1957, pp. 40ff, pp. 318ff.
^Feb 7, 41, p. 7; Jan 35, p. 5.
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white, and they burn all night and nobody Is alrald the airplane will
come
.
As the AUFBAU was steadily read by more and more immigrants who
established themselves in New York permanently, the paper and also the
German Jewish Club developed an almost scientific interest in the ways
the city functioned: its political system, its history, and its
hidden beauties. In articles about important local politicians such as
Fiorello LaGuardia, Robert F. Wagner, and Stanley Isaacs (borough
president of Manhattan)
. The AUFBAU tried to evoke some political
identification with New York among its readers. 5 In regular columns
entitled "New Yorker Notizbuch" (New Yorker Notebook), "Crosstown," and
Girl about Town," AUFBAU journalists perceptively recorded their
observations about the varied ways of life in the city.
6
From summer 1941 on throughout the war, AUFBAU readers received
suggestions for exploring the city and its surroundings on their own in
trips to New York's different neighborhoods and landmarks. ^ The
history of New York was the topic of an extensive lecture program that
the German-Jewish Club started in 1941 arid which remained a big success
throughout the war. It offered lectures and guided tours through the
^AFSC Bulletin
,
No. 7, p. 2.
5
Dec 29, 40, p. 1; Oct 32, 41, p. 6; Dec 27, 40, p. 5.
£
"Crosstown": Summer and Fall 1939; "New Yorker Notizbuch," throughout
the paper, starting 1938; "Girl about Town," irregularly after Dec 1941.
^
"Within 20 miles" (Hans Hacker) appears regularly except during the
Winter.
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cifcy aH Club members .
^
The AUFBAU certainly did its best to create among the refugees a
sense of conscious identification with this rather untypical African
City. This was of special importance to the many refugees in New York
who lived a rather isolated existence. By 1939 refugees from Austria
and Germany had settled in such large numbers in the city that they
formed something like an autonomous ethnic subculture there. In
certain sections of the city, especially in Washington Heights, they
lished gathering points (the cafes on the upper West side) and
they had their own newspaper (the AUFBAU). 9 But the paper looked on
these special forms of New Yorkization with mixed feelings. The
development of a little Berlin or Vienna did not seem to promote the
much heralded Americanization of the refugee. The paper therefore
either consistently ignored many parts of this refugee ethnicity or
explicitly discouraged its readers from becoming part of it. 10
But much of the city's glamour and diversity was not accessible at
all to the refugees. For many of them the city as a whole was too
large, too complicated, and too fast moving and competitive. As
several stories in the paper testify, many refugees found it almost
impossible to develop permanency and security in New York City. But
worst of all, in the AUFBAU' s opinion, was the conviction that staying
there prevented assimilation to the American way of life for many
"This is your city" starts in Nov. 1940.
9
Judd Teller, Strangers and Natives, New York 1968, p. 4.
10
Dec 27, 40, pp. 3/4; Nov 15, 39, p. 20.
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refugees. This reasoning clearly points towards a somewhat schisophrenic
attitude on the part of the paper. On the one hand, most of its
readers lived in New York and apparently appreciated this in many ways
and succeeded in developing personal ties to the city. On the other
hand, the paper saw its efforts to Americanize the refugees imperiled
by the segregation and isolation that many refugees experienced there.
The magic pull of New York was a problem not only for the AUFBAU,
but almost all refugee agencies were confronted with it as well. In
1939 the National Refugee Service began to organize a large scale
systematic resettlement program. It was based on the idea that, although
many refugees lived in New York and wanted to settle there, the chances
of achieving any degree of social and economic stability there were
minimal for many of them, as were their general prospects for becoming
Americanized. The National Refugee Service wanted to offer the new
immigrants from Europe an alternative way of settlement which would bring
them better prospects of integration. More than 800 local resettlement
centers in cities throughout the country were therefore developed by the
NRS. These groups consisted mainly of representatives of the local
Jewish communities. Each of them pledged to take care of a certain
number of newly arrived refugees each year; find jobs for them and
provide housing and financial assistance if necessary. The central
agency tried to match the wishes and needs of each community carefully
12
with those of the refugees. Resettlement centers were distributed
UJuly 37, p.
12White, op.
6; March 8, 40, p. 6.
cit., Ch. XII passim.
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rather evenly throughout the country; most of them were Located In smaller
towns or middle sited cities. The Southern states were slightly under-
represented; the North Eastern and North Central states were somewhat
favored as resettlement areas.
13
But the program met considerable resistance from refugees who,
once settled in New York, were unwilling to move again to places they
had never heard of. During the peak years of immigration, from 1939
to 1941, the National Refugee Service made participation in the resettle-
ment program mandatory for all immigrants who wanted to use the migration
services of the NRS
. Still, only about 11% of all refugees from Europe
who came at that time were resettled outside New York City. 1^
For most of those who did participate, the program seemed to work
rather well in opening viable alternatives to life in New York City.
Eventual difficulties arose mainly from the contradictory ideology
on which the NRS based its activities. The agency's foremost goal was
to provide the refugee with a chance to assimilate to American society.
Yet it also wanted to make every effort to preserve the immigrant's ties
to his Jewish heritage. This led to conflicts with some Jewish communities.
Many refugees did not fit into the often overly narrow restrictions
that the local committees set for selecting immigrants; older people or
orthodox Jews were especially unlikely to be welcomed by many communities.
Sometimes resettlement committees even refused to take any more
resettlers. In theory, the National Refugee Service also wanted to
^NRS, Annual Report 1939, p. 18.
14
White, op. cit., pp. 315-317, p. 332.
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grant the immigrant a genuine choice of where to go; in practice,
however, it had to resort to rather coercive measures to make the
resettlement program work at all.
15
One major problem, which was probably unavoidable in such a large
scale enterprise, was the often impersonal nature of the National
Refugee Service's assistance. This becomes clear by contrasting NRS
efficiency with the more personalized, small scale efforts of the
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) to resettle refugees throughout
the country. The AFSC had very limited financial means and operated on
a small and rather selective basis. For the few refugees it could take
care of, it was nevertheless very helpful. 16 in general its activities
were not geared towards any systematic relocation or retraining plan.
Instead, personalized services and counseling were emphasized. Most
effective and appreciated by AUFBAU readers seemed to have been the AFSC
Americanization hostels for newly arrived immigrants and the summer
vacation programs organized for tired refugee New Yorkers. In New
York and Philadelphia the Friends also made decided efforts to bring
refugees and Americans together for social events. In some cases
American host families took care of refugees on an individual basis
until the newcomers had adjusted themselves fully.
^
In its own way the AUFBAU too tried to play an active part in the
resettlement activities. Besides propagandizing the resettlement idea
l-Hjhite, op. cit. pp. 311, 312, 321 and Zosa Szajkowski, "The
Attitude of American Jews to Refugees," in American Jewish Historical
Quarterly
,
Dec. 1971, pp. 132f.
16May 8, 41, p. 14.
1
^AFSC Bulletins, Nos. 1, 4, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18.
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and informing readers about the activities of NRS and AFSC, It published
a resettlement column "Soil Ich in den Westen gehen? " (shall I go
West?)
. Here a reader from Oregon, himself a resettled refugee answered
frequently asked questions about resettlement on the West Coast.
18
Many individual articles, most of them printed in the Westkuste (West
coast) pages, provided AUFBAU readers with general information about
life at the other end of the United States. 19 But neither paper nor
Club ever attempted to initiate any organized resettlement activities
on their own. Difficult questions or requests for further aid were
usually referred to the local NRS committees, Jewish organizations, or
local Chambers of Commerce.
At least as important as factual accounts of resettlement were
the enthusiastic reports of refugees who had resettled successfully.
Compared to the sophisticated articles about life in New York, these
stories read like naive tales from a far away wonderland, even though
they came from places only a few hours from the city. Usually these
accounts were too rose-tinted to give any clear picture of what the
American hinterland was really like. Resettlers preferred to stress
the general impression that anybody could find a better life almost
anywhere in the country outside New York. For most of these happy
immigrants better job opportunities and more social contacts with
Americans had almost automatically resulted from resettlement. Only
after moving away from New York City could the refugee face the real
1 8Starts in Sep 1940s and continues irregularly every 2 to 4 weeks.
^"West Coast": Feb 20, 42, p. 15; Dec 11, 42, p. 15; Aug 7, 42,
p. 15; July 7, 43, p. 15; July 7. 43, p. 14; other places: Nov 19, 23,
p. 26; Nov. 26, p. 25 (Chicago); Dec 3, 43, p. 29 (Wisconsin); Jan 28,
44, p. 24; Feb. 4, 44, p. 30 (Philadelphia).
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challenges of life in America and make a total break with his European
20past, these readers stated.
Some characteristics of American small town life stood out particu-
larly m all these enthusiastic articles. Newly arrived refugees
were often helped on a very personal basis by local Jewish organizations.
They were not treated as charity recipients, but as newcomers who
were given a chance to help themselves to a certain extent. For many
immigrants, socialization and the establishment of personal relationships
with other Americans became possible for the first time since they
had arrived in America.
The great physical comfort of most refugees who had moved away
from the urban areas was also discernable from these reports. The
whole pace of life was more modest in the country, and the physical
and social structure of the new environment easily became familiar and
remained unchanged. This gave life in the hinterland the look of
permanency, a look which was enhanced through a general feeling of
closeness to nature.
This perception of a paradise-like physical environment was
especially stressed by those refugees who had settled on the California
coast. But until 1942 California resettlers were confronted with the
sharp contrast between the abundance of nature and the depressed
economic circumstances in which most of them found themselves. Life
in California, the AUFBAU reader could learn, was an odd mixture of
20
Dec 5, 41, p. 40; Dec 11, 42, p. 15.
^March 38, pp. 6/7; Feb 20, 42, p. 15.
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some of the worst evils of urban life and the best advantages of the
22
countryside.
Readers from California, therefore, usually did not show the
usual enthusiasm for resettlement. The somewhat gloomy tone of most
articles from the West Coast became even stronger during 1942 when
stringent curfew laws were imposed on most refugees who lived there.
Enemy aliens (and Japanese Americans) had to stay in their homes from
8 p.m. to 6 a.m. every day and were not allowed to go more than five
miles beyond their homes at all. This measure heightened the isolation
of many refugees from each other, a problem that had plagued some of
the new immigrants there before.
2 /
^
But by 1943, when the curfew was abolished, the West Coast
quickly acquired the golden colored image of the land of opportunity in
the pages of the AUFBAU. The war boom on the Pacific created plenty of
well paid jobs for the refugees and from 1943 on, West Coast readers
25definitely urged easterners to move west. Only a few readers wondered
what would happen to them when the war boom was over and their jobs
gone. Would a new depression haunt the golden west, or would the
refugees soon acquire a stable middle class position that would shelter
26
them from a new uprooting experience?
22
Sep 4, 40, p. 21; Nov 14, 41, p. 114; Nov 28, 41, p. 15 May 17, 42, p. 1
^Dec 19, 41, p. 7; Jan 9, 42, p. 16; Feb 6, 42, p. 15; Feb 13,
42, p. 1; Mar 13, 42, p. 3; Apr 3, 42, p. 17; Apr 17, 42, p. 17, Radkau, p. 109
^Jan 1, 43, p. 5.
2~*June 26, 43, p. 15; July 10, 43, p. 17; Aug 7, 43, p. 15; Apr 14 ,
44, p. 19.
26Apr 14, 44, p. 19.
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CHAPTER VII
WOMEN, YOUNG PEOPLE, AND THE CHANGE IN FAMILY STRUCTURE
Among the refugees as a group, women and children held a special
position. In absolute numbers they constituted a majority, but as a
rule they were confronted with more than the usual amount of changes
and conflicting images about their social positions.^ The paper
reflected an awareness of these special problems in that it allocated
definite space to the discussion of issues facing women and children.
Women, as the AUFBAU portrayed them, could clearly be divided
into three different groups which appeared in different parts of the
paper and seemingly had nothing to do with each other. In the first
pages the reader found articles about women who were nationally known
because of their political positions or their fame as movie-stars,
artists, or musicians. In the back pages of the AUFBAU, problems in
the lives of refugee women formed the subject of discussion in mnay
articles. Finally, a synthetic portrait of "the American woman" was
attempted on the special page "Fur die Frau" (for women)
.
The celebrities among American women usually appeared as distant
stars whose lives had no direct impact upon the everyday routine of the
female AUFBAU reader. They served as far off, idolized models. Women
engaged in political activities were also seen as spokespersons for an
otherwise silent majority. Many of them were representatives or at
least active supporters of the refugees. In this role they appealed
^Kurt Grossmann, Arieh Tartakower, The Jewish Refugee
,
New York
1944, pp. 358/59.
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to the general public as crusaders for the refugees’ plight. Eleanor
Roosevelt and Dorothy Thompson were among the most active political
women portrayed in the AUFBAU. Thomas Mann’s daughter, Erika, played
an important role as a representative of the intellectual migration. 2
A number of women were presented by the AUFBAU as foremost represen-
tatives of the American Jewish community, including Lillian Wald,
Bella Spewack, and Rachel Vixmann. 3 Usually these women were described
and discussed no differently than men. The assessment of their
achievements and importance rested exclusively on political factors.
Movie-stars and female artists were even more out of touch with
the life of the average AUFBAU reader than the professional women.
Their appeal usually had no political flavor (emigre actresses like
Marlene Dietrich and Louise Rainer were exceptions).^ They were mostly
admired as glamorous inhabitants of the far away fairy-tale world in
Hollywood. The glorification of these beauty queens should not have
been new to most AUFBAU readers. In this respect the culture of the
Weimar Republic had already been thoroughly Americanized.
In the back pages of the AUFBAU a distinctly different image of
women emerged from stories about the everyday life of female refugees.
These narratives showed that in many ways their process of adjustment
was harder than that of most men. Many women had only known relatively
2Aug. 30, 40, p. 20; July 5, 40, p. 3; May 31, 40, p. 20; Dec 18,
43, p. 24.
3
July 5, 40, p. 3; May 31, 40, p. 20; Oct 17, 41, p. 24.
'Siarch 1, 40, p. 4.
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carefree lives as middle-class housewives in Europe. They had never
held paid jobs, nor had they received any practical training. While
the husband supported the family, housekeeping and child rearing were
considered to be the only appropriate tasks for married women; most
of them even had domestic servants to help with this.
The critical financial situation facing the refugees upon their
arrival in the United States forced most families to change this order
in basic ways. In a majority of cases both husband and wife had to
find jobs in order to be able to support the family. Often enough
women found work as domestic servants much sooner than their over
qualified husbands. Other women became saleswomen, typists, or
factory-workers. Those who had learned trades usually found jobs
rather easily as tailors, milliners, or hairdressers . ^ Others made
use of the opportunities to acquire skills as seamstresses, bakers, or
beauticians, with the help of the National Refugee Service. ^ A few even
gfound chances to open businesses of their own. The new importance of
women as supporters of the family created difficult problems for refugee
husbands and fathers because of the resulting decline in their own
position. The AUFBAU, however, did not discuss this issue, but focused
5Nov 22, 40, p. 14.
^Apr. 18, 41, p. 12; Sep. 26, 41, p. 12.
^Nov 22, 40, p. 14.
Q
National Refugee Service, Community Service Releases; Employment
and Retraining, Nos. 7, 9, 12, 15, 18, 22 (February-November 1941).
9
This can be learned from the numerous advertisements in the AUFBAU
for beauty parlors, tailors, and other businesses run by refugee women.
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on the difficulties women had in adapting to their changed roles.
The pages of the AUFBAU do not make it entirely clear how well
women adjusted to their new position as wage earners. In the pre-war
years most of them looked upon themselves as overworked housewives and
mothers engaged in an heroic struggle to keep the family financially
independent and emotionally stable. A positive relationship to the
paid work they did was hardly possible under such overwhelming
10
pressures
.
Secondary sources place a somewhat different emphasis on the
refugee women's changed role. Compared to the difficulties most male
refugees had in adjusting to a status loss, their wives showed outstand-
ing social mobility. Women usually had much more willpower in over-
coming initial difficulties and they held low status jobs without fear
of losing their personal dignity. Most of them also showed considerable
inventiveness and talent for improvisation in changing from the ways the
family had functioned traditionally
.
^
But these changing attitudes were reflected in a limited way in
the innumerable articles that appeared on household organization and
fashion matters in the AUFBAU' s women's pages. These parts of the
paper suggested that Americanization for the refugee woman meant,
primarily, a reorganization of the household, a change of the family's
^Apr. 5, 40, p. 8; Dec 22, 44, p. 26.
^Maurice Davie, The Refugee in the United States
,
New York 1948,
pp. 124/125; Donald P. Kent, The Refugee Intellectual
,
New York 1943,
p. 211.
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eating habits, and a different way of dressing. 12 what made the
American woman different from the refugee housewife, in these pages,
»as not so much her different position as a wage earner, but merely her
appearance as a perfect hostess, up to date in fashion matters, and a
competent manager of household and family.
13
The AUFBAU's idea of American womanhood changed decisively during
the war years. Then women, as well as children and men, were all
equally engaged in the war effort. The anti-fascist fight reached
even the last country kitchen. For the AUFBAU this meant that women,
like everyone else, were seen in a larger social and political context,
rather than as something special and separate. Refugee housewives in
particular were encouraged to find a job or to volunteer for the Civil
Defense or the Red Cross. 4 If they wanted to stay with their families,
they were advised by the paper to take care of children of mothers who
.
.
15
were working. Even the food and fashion columns took on a new shape.
Like all American women, AUFBAU readers received extensive advice
concerning the saving of food and other materials; every empty can was
a bullet against Hitler, the paper reminded its readers. 16 Fashion was
not abolished, but it expressed the spirit of the times. Women wore
1
2
,Women s page starts in Nov. 1940, and contains regular columns
about fashion and household organization. Table manners in U.S. are
discussed in Dec. 4, 42, p. 11.
13
May 17, 40, p. 10.
l 4July 14, 42, p. 17; Jan. 8, 42, p.16; Jan 22, 43, p. 9.
15Aug 26, 42, p. 19.
160ct 9, 42, p. 21; Oct. 23, 42, p. 21; Nov. 6, 42, p. 11.
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uniform- like garments and the AUFBAU appropriately discussed the question
of how to dress for war bond drives.
17
During the war, women workers became the focus of attention, as
suddenly they were a badly needed addition to the work force; a host of
well paid factory jobs opened to them. Women began to unionize and
demand equal pay for equal work. Some women, the AUFBAU reported,
even took over the businesses of their husbands while the latter went
into the Army. 19 Others did not want to confine themselves to work on
the homefront and joined the Women's Army Corps. 20 The achievements
and new roles of these women were generally understood to be patriotic
contributions to the war effort of the Nations.
Occasionally, however, the AUFBAU' s women editors celebrated the
basic changes in attitudes and roles of American as well as refugee
women. They admitted that, in their view, refugee women especially
had encountered a fundamentally new view of their own femininity that
was shaped by the changing position of women in the United States during
the Depression and war years. The beautiful but idle housewife was no
longer a desirable image for women, the paper stated with satisfaction;
instead, the uncomplicated, practical, hard working "girl" was what
every woman wanted to be. Every woman held a job; even housewives
May 1, 42, p. 16, p. 22; Aug 7, 42, p. 18.
18
Sep. 3, 43, p. 19; Richard Polenberg, War And Society , New York
1972, pp. 146-148; Richard Lingeman, Don't You Know There's A War On?
New York 1970, pp. 148 ff.
1 9
Aug. 4, 44, p. 18; Lingeman, p. 155/156.
20
Jan 29, 43, p. 22; Aug 22, 43, p. 17.
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considered themselves as having a regular profession. 21
The recognition of basic changes in the role of women in America
was signalled even more clearly in the increasing prominence of women
professionals in the paper. In 1943 the AUFBAU portrayed a number of
important women journalists in a regular series. Helen Gahagan, Claire
Boothe Luce, and Bette Davis were other prominent women whose achievements
were discussed in the paper.
22
the notable difference between these
articles and the traditional coverage of female politicians was that
women were no longer seen as sexless political figures, but as foremost
representatives of their own sex.
This development of an independent position for most women was a
clear danger to true American womanhood, warned Professor Eric Mosse
in comments made in the late 1943 to the students of Hunter College.
Without adverse comment, the AUFBAU recorded his opinions on the dangers
of an increasing masculinity of women in wartime America. 23 But any
such fears were decidedly premature, as the wartime change in the
position of refugee women turned out to be rather temporary in nature.
The AUFBAU observed accurately that in 1944 a considerable number of
women were among the first workers to be dismissed as the war boom
slowed; the differences between men's and women's wages also increased
,
24
as the economy eased.
21
Nov. 21, 41, p. 3; Feb. 19, 43, p. 17.
22
„ ,Aug. 6, 43, p. 19; July 28, 44, p. 19; Journalist series starts
July 43 and ends in Oct 43.
23
Nov. 19, 43, p. 17.
2t
Aug. 25, 44, p. 19.
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What was the overall perspective of the women refugees then?
Women's page editor Vera Greener offered a rather pragmatic assessment
Of the situation In December 1944. She contended that refugee women
were probably the class of refugees for whom life had changed most
radically through the emigration experience. But, although their
self-reliance and their self confidence had Increased in most cases,
they saw no need to reassess their position as women in any fundamental
way. They were busy enough balancing their basic needs with the demands
of their families, while trying to fit into the somewhat different role
9 S
of the American woman.
If the changes that affected women were only partly of a basic
nature, the different position of children in this country certainly
affected the whole structure of refugee families in a fundamental way.
Differences between the old and the new world in the upbringing of
children touched on many fundamental issues of assimilation and
acculturation of refugee families.
Children who had reached the United States together with their
parents (this became more and more rare during the war years) were
usually a heavy burden on their families. As many youngsters had gone
through rather traumatic experiences in Europe, many needed special
care in being introduced to the different ways of life in the new
26homecountry. Yet professional help was generally not available to
them, and even the parents themselves were usually unable to devote
2
^Dec. 22, 44, p. 26.
26Sep . 19, 41, p. 19; July 10, 42, p. 32.
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much time to their children. They had to earn a living and often
enough they were forced to place their children in institutions or
with foster parents, at least for some time after their arrival. 27
Financial need was among the main problems of families with children.
The German-Jewish Club's social worker therefore often received
requests for advice from refugee youths who did not know how to deal
with the social isolation that stemmed from the fact that most of
them did not have enough money to associate freely with their American
peers. They could not go out to the movies, invite girls out for
dates, or go to summer camp like their friends did. 28
Often the desire to achieve a more independent financial position,
as well as the pressing economic problems of the parents, caused
refugee teenagers to leave school prematurely and take work as unskilled
laborers. Especially during the war years, when such jobs were easily
available and well paid, the AUFBAU repeatedly urged refugee parents to
do everything possible to provide their children with a good education. 29
News about the increasing lack of discipline in schools and the rapid
rise of juvenile delinquency throughout the country were alarming signs
to the paper that pointed to a lack of parental supervision and a
30decaying family order in general.
^May 24, 40, p. 9.
28May 16, 40, p. 5; Apr. 19, 40, p. 17.
29Dec 8, 39, p. 11; Oct 25, 40, p. 10; Feb 38, p. 11; Feb 37, p. 2;
Apr. 11, 41, p. 5; Sep. 22, 43, p. 16.
Qf)
Jan. 2, 43, p. 4; Dec 14, 43, p. 21; Dec. 25, 43, p. 4; Lingeman,
pp. 87-89; Polenberg, pp. 149/150.
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The most significant problem in relation to the role of refugee
children, however, seems to have originated from different trends. In
most cases the children proved to be more quickly and easily Americanized
than their parents. They established a basis for the future cultural
and structural assimilation of the refugees.
31
Thus the AUFBAU
,
as
well as secondary sources, portrayed refugee children as the most
generally successful group of refugees. They were thankful recipients
of all charitable efforts; they did not criticize much or complain
about their new country. They did not shut themselves off, but learned
the language quickly and associated freely with other American children.
Obviously they also did not take jobs away from Americans and consequently
it hurt nobody to point out the achievements of these young future
Americans. The AUFBAU published innumerable patriotic hymns, speeches,
32and articles by and about refugee children. Children were symbols of
a better future.
But the exemplary adjustment and the near-perfect assimilation of
their children posed serious problems for most refugee parents. Many
of the difficulties with overly independent children and teenagers thus
attained a larger social dimension. Was it acceptable for half grown
youths to go out on their own, or to find their own jobs? Could children
really be sent away alone to go to summer camp? The social worker who
discussed these problems in the paper tried to point out that such
independence of children was a natural thing, since in America young
^Feb 38, p. 11; Oct 25, 40, p. 10; Davie Ch. XIII passim.
32
Dec. 13, 40, p. 3; Dec 29, 39, pp. 1/2; Sep. 6, 40, p. 2.
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people enjoyed considerable freedon, fro. parental authority from an
early age on. Moreover, the special situation of most refugee families
forced many youths to stand on their own feet, often they turned out
to be the main help for the parent's adjustment, thus changing the
pattern of responsibility and authority in the family. 33
This was seen as such a serious problem to many AUFBAU readers
that the German-Jewish Club organized a conference on the problems and
position of young refugees. The problems of course were more those of
the parents than those of the youngsters themselves.
34
The AUFBAU does
not discuss the results of this meeting, but one can presume that the
refugees took the opportunity to compare some of the basically different
patterns that shaped family life in Germany and in the United States.
While the European middle class family was a tightly knit unit that
provided not only protection and emotional warmth for the children,
but also a great part of their education, the refugees found a largely
professionalized educational system in the United States. Public
schools and other institutions took care of all school-age children
from morning to night. And youngsters were encouraged to spend their
leisure time with people their own age, joining various clubs for
sports or social activities. The idea that children were educated
mainly by a professional class of educators and their own peers must
have been difficult to accept for many European parents since it
diminished their role as the major authorities in the education of
330ct 25, 41, p. 10; Dec. 8, 39, p. 11.
^ May 23, 41, p. 4; May 30, 41, p. 4.
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their children
35
In an intriguing effort to cope with these very problems, the
Club founded its own youth group within the German-Jewish Club.
Presumably this presented an answer in a twofold way. Young people
had their own independent organization, and the idea of American
peer education was followed in principle. All activities of this
youth group, however remained under the auspices of the adult organiza-
tion with its rather solid European outlook on education and culture.
The family situation of the refugees reflected the overall dilemma
of the new immigrants. They tried to avoid all conspicuousness and,
rejecting the slow path of Americanization that previous generations of
immigrants had taken, they tried to appear American from their first
day on. But this deliberate attempt to look and behave as American as
possible led to a distortion of the refugees' image of themselves. In
actuality, the new immigrants quite often showed signs of definite
ethnic behavior in their manners and in their employment and settlement
patterns. But they themselves did not recognize the fact that in many
ways they were not so different from previous groups of immigrants. In
some instances the AUFBAU openly criticized the behavior of many refugees
as non-American. Problems relating to the different understanding of
social and family life among refugees were also frankly discussed at
times. But other factors pointing toward an ethnic pattern of assimila-
^“*Davie, pp. 147/8.
"^Oct. 31 } 42, p. 5 (group is founded); Feb 20, 42, p. 13 (first
issues of youth page); June 2, 42, p. 15.
85
tion, such as the preferences for certain professions and settlement
g' ns, were largely ignored or only brought up in connection with
general economic questions. Such limited perspectives and distortions
determined not only the perception refugees had of themselves, but also
their view of America and American society.
PART II. THE REFUGEES LOOK AT AMERICA
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CHAPTER VIII
AUFBAU AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ORDER
For most refugees the encounter with America as a new home country
was individual and deeply emotional. In story after story about the
initial impressions of newly arrived refugees, the smiling face of
America's social and political order was the dominant theme. Friendly
contacts with bureaucracies and the general "take-it easy" attitudes of
the population impressed the newcomers from authoritarian Europe. All
these experiences were invariably connected with the refugees' under-
standing of the meaning of democracy and freedom in the New World.
1
"America is Different" was appropriately the title of an AUFBAU column
which talked about everyday encounters with Americans and their society.
The author of this series tried to prove that a democratic political
order as established in the United States produced better individual
citizens, especially friendlier ones, and a more humane environment .
^
The paper approached most events in American history from the same
emotion-based and personalized perspective. Washington, and especially
3Lincoln, were literally held as saints. Such national celebrations as
the Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, and Labor Day were regarded as
opportunities for every immigrant to show his strong emotional dedication
to the American system. The AUFBAU' s articles for the national holidays
made it look as though the immigrants identified with the American past
Jan. 35, p. 5; Feb
.
Dec
.
27, 39, p . 3.
Feb 14, 41, p . 4.
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because they themselves had taken part in creating it. 4 This use of
American history as an emotional homestead which gave the immigrants
the possibility of identifying closely with basic American patriotism
was of course in the best American tradition. The idea of being in
line with previous historical events was also of special importance
during the war years when the refugees were in particular need of a
reassuring ideological identity.
Not only the American past, but also the present political system
became one of the very centers of the unquestionable goodness of the
United States as a homeland. The refugees voiced criticisms of various
aspects of American life, its mass culture or its social structure, for
example. But they never doubted that the American political system was
the embodiment of the American democratic ideal. They therefore
believed unconditionally that all actions of the elected government
were serving the interest of the people at all times.
In the discussion of everyday politics such a position was hard for
any openminded newspaper to adhere to. If all actions of the government
were in the people's interest, was the elected majority then automatically
the representative of the absolute good in politics? Initially the
AUFBAU tried to solve the problems arising from the obvious discrepancy
of democracy in theory and practice in a very simple fashion: the paper
declared that it would remain aloof from all politics whatsoever. As
late as December 1939 and February 1940, the editors expressed as a
statement of policy: "We will hold up freedom and democracy, we will
^July 5, 40, p. 7; Sep. 6, 40, p. 2; Nov. 22, 40, p. 3; Sep. 4, 42, pp. 1-
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avoid politics and all quarrels about political questions of the day." 5
Needless to say, by the time the declaration was made many Important
political questions of the day. Including the position of American
Judaism, the refugee problem, and anti-Semitism, had already been
discussed extensively in the paper.
But in fact, the apolitical line of the AUFBAU had remained consis-
tent throughout the thirties insofar as the domestic political scene
was concerned. The two main topics of the times, the Depression and
the New Deal, were only mentioned in indirect ways. The Depression
formed the background of many discouraging stories about refugees looking
for work. But the New Deal was only described once, very briefly, in
1939. Otherwise, domestic politics remained rather obscure until 1940.
^
The AUFBAU 's concern with foreign affairs, on the other hand, had
become strong by 1938/1939. The increasing danger of war during the
multiplying crises in Europe and Asia was frequently discussed, and
especially those events connected with the refugee question were recorded
quite regularly in the paper. Clearly the AUFBAU had broken its general
"no politics" vow long before 1940.
^
But discussion of American domestic politics clearly required a
more direct political commitment than did expression of views on world
events. A careful and sometimes successful way out of the paper's
obvious fear of being caught up in quarrels about politics was to offer
^Dec
. 8, 39, p. 16; Feb. 16, 40, p. 6; (also Dec. 34, p. 3).
^Aug. 1, 39, p. 3.
^June 36, p. 4; July 15, 39, pp. 1/2; Sep. 15, 39, pp. 1/2.
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purely descriptive reports about the American political system, thus
an article "Unpolltlsches uber die Amerlkanische Verfassung” ("Non-
political Comments about the American Constitution") that appeared in
early 1935 conformed to the political abstinence principle, yet It also
provided the refugee with some basic information about his new home
8
country. Following the same descriptive fashion, numerous articles
about the government and the political system appeared throughout the
war years. They were mostly aimed at teaching the ignorant newcomer
some basics about the form and meaning of democracy.
9
In 1944, for
example, the paper printed a series aimed at preparing the refugee for
his citizenship test. Part of the information dealt with the form and
function of the judiciary system. The F.B.I. and other law enforcement
agencies that were concerned with investigation of spies and enemy
aliens were described in another instance. The machinery of politics
in New York state was the subject of a whole series of articles.
Elections and the election process played a central role in the
AUFBAU's perspective on the American political system. The principle
of remaining apolitical was broken, temporarily, in a 1936 report on
the presidential elections entitled "War Clouds Overshadow the Election
Campaign" (!) . In this, and in later reports about upcoming elections,
8
Jan. 35, p. 10.
9
July 5, 40, p. 7; Nov. 22, 40, p. 5; June 9, 41, p. 10; Oct. 27
41, p. 21.
^June 9, 44, p. 10; Oct. 27, 44, p. 21; Apr. 7, 44, p. 3.
^June 5, 42, p. 5; "Politics and Politicians in New York State"
starts Sep. 42, p. 9.
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campaigns were usually seen as potentially disruptive events at a time
when continuity and definite leadership were needed most. The basic
misunderstanding of the function of elections came out most clearly in
the elections of 1940, a year which the AUFBAU considered as particularly
. .
12
critical. Yet the paper never specified what was so disturbing about
election campaigns and the confrontations of candidates and issues.
Because the election process as such looked so problematic to the
AUFBAU, parties, candidates, and controversial issues of the campaign
were of secondary importance. The AUFBAU also shied away from discussing
the role of political parties in elections and as a basis for governmental
power. Before the election of 1944 (when a large number of refugees
13
were allowed to vote for the first time ) the paper made some attempts
to explain to its readers the differences between the two major political
parties in two articles on the national conventions of the Republicans
and the Democrats. The writer of these articles did not offer any
analytical insights in the problems facing the two parties; his descrip-
tion of events was superficial and showed a rather undisguised pro-
14
Democratic view.
Conflicts and debates between the parties, as they usually took
place in Congress and other branches of the government, met the decided
12
Jan. 19, 40, p. 8; Oct. 4, 40, p. 2; Dec. 14, 40, p. 5.
13
This had to do with the fact that refugee could apply for
citizenship (second papers) only after five years of residence in the
United States. Only by 1944 were a sizable number able to do that; namely,
those who had immigrated during the great rush years of 1938/39.
14
July 7, 44, p. 7; July 28, 44, p. 4; Oct. 6, 44, p. 42; Nov. 33,
44, p. 32.
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Disapproval of the AUFBAU
, especially during the war. The
this fear of opposition was usually similar to the paper's
reason for
uneasiness
about elections. In 1942 its advocacy of "National Unity" concerning all
domestic and foreign issues went so far as to suggest an abandonment
of party affiliations for all legislators for the duration of the war. 15
With great satisfaction did the paper register in 1943 that the
traditional blocs in congress (the farm bloc, the business supporters,
etc.) were disintegrating and that everyone had started working together
in the national interest instead of catering only to one particular
lobbying group. Only the isolationists in Congress continued to
draw the AUFBAU' s fire; throughout the war the paper never really trusted
their disappearance. 17 AUFBAU 's inadequate portrait of the functioning
of political parties was dominated by the paper's skewed perspective which
saw different interests and conflicts in American politics merely as
potential disturbance factors rather than as the basic principle of
democratic institutions.
A potential third force on the American political landscape, the
trade unions, received similarly unrealistic treatment. From the
outset, however, the AUFBAU 's attitude appeared to be different in one
respect: labor problems received rather prominent space in the paper,
especially in Siegfrid Aufhauser's "Review of Labor" column which appeared
each week from 1940 until 1944. Aufhauser's contributions were usually
15
March 6, 42, p. 2; June 12, 42, p. 9; Oct. 2, 42, p. 2.
^Oct. 2, 42, pp. 2/4.
17
Jan. 29, 42, p. 4.
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informative and descriptive, rather than analytical. And he avoided
taking sides in the major debate of organised labor In the pre-„ar years,
the conflict between the AFL and the CIO.
In the war years the AUFBAU welcomed the unified stance of the
. ,
.
18
rade unions; the increasing cooperation between unions, government,
and big business; and such measures as wage ceilings, price controls,
and anti-strike laws. The AUFBAU saw the development of comprehensive
governmental war regulations, which made it impossible for trade unions
to constitute an independent third force in domestic policies, as a
positive sign that national unity was a reality. 20
In the paper’s view, the presidency and its occupant, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, comprised the most decisive and probably the only truly
relevant power in the American governmental setup. Yet the constitutional
and political nature of the office of the President was never discussed
in any basic form. Presidential policies meant Roosevelt's policies;
his personality overshadowed the constitutional basis of his power.
Presidential actions were usually judged from the standpoint of
foreign affairs. And, as Roosevelt was considered to be a firm supporter
of the refugee cause, the AUFBAU' s support of everything he did was
unconditional. Roosevelt's speeches and proclamations in favor of
refugees thus dominated the headlines of the paper; likewise, his
Apr. 5, 40, p. 8, first article of the "Review of Labor" series;
also Jan 2, 42, p. 14; Aug. 21, 42, p. 8.
^°May 22, 41, p. 24; Jan. 2, 42, p. 14; May 21, 43, p. 3; Sep. 17,
p. 43, p. 4.
20
July 23, 43, p. 15; Sep. 3, 43, p. 18.
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attempts to prepare America for entering the war were widely hailed. 21
Not only did the paper refrain from criticising any of Roosevelt's
actions, but even such failures as the St. Louis refugee ship affair of
1939, the Bermuda Conference on refugees in 1943, and the ominous
silence of Roosevelt about plans for postwar Germany were interpreted
as positive achievements of the President. 22
The focus on Roosevelt's personal actions soon developed into an
idolization of the President. He emerged as the national father figure,
especially after elections and on national holidays. After 1942 the
paper regularly printed birthday messages to Roosevelt (and he did not
neglect to send the paper a greeting on its tenth anniversary). 23 in
an editorial in 1941 Roosevelt was extolled in the following way:
"Dieses machtige Gesicht ist wie eine Landschaft,
vertraut, anheimelnd, voll eines unverdeckten Lebens,
Gute und naturliche Kraft atmend. Und wenn man es dann
im Kreise seiner Familiengesichter sieht, so verstarkt
sich der Eindruck, nirgends wird die Harmonie gestort.
Eine klare und gute Ahnenrasse hat hier ihre Fortsetzung
ge funden.
21 July 5, 40, p. 1; Jan. 24, 41, p. 8; Feb. 6, 42, p. 6; Sep. 13,
40, p. 4; Sep. 27, 40, p. 7 are early examples.
22
June 15, 39, pp. 15/16; July 1, 39, p. 5; Oct. 15, 39, p. 10;
Sep. 17, 43, p. 4.
23
Dec 22, 44, p. 2.
OA
^Feb. 28, 41, p. 4. "This mighty face is like a landscape, familiar,
homey, full of undisguised life, breathing kindliness and natural power.
And if seen admidst its family faces the impression is confirmed; nowhere
is the harmony disturbed. A good and clear stock has found its continuation
here." The German text is as awkward as the translation! The editorial
in which Roosevelt was celebrated with such imagery dealt with the signifi-
cance of the facial expressions of the good and evil leaders of the war.
Hitler's face was seen as incorporating all the elements of a gangster-
character; a Japanese general's physique was likewise that of a low race
(!) of human beings.
94
Eleanor Roosevelt figured almost as prominently as her husband in
the headlines of the AUFBAU
. This was probably justified, as the first
lady made refugees one of her special "pet" concerns. The AUFBAU
printed her statements on every relevant issue, especially those on
anti-alienism and anti-Semitism. 25
In view of the paper's beliefs concerning the royal functions of
the President, it was not surprising that major and minor figures in
the government appeared mostly as only delegates of Roosevelt. At no
point could the AUFBAU reader obtain a clear view of who actually
comprised Roosevelt's wartime Cabinet and who were his personal advisers.
Numerous spokesmen of the wartime administration did appear regularly in
the AUFBAU' s pages. Attorney General Francis Biddle and Vice President
Henry Wallace were often quoted on issues concerning alien and refugee
policies, as well as on fundamental matters such as war aims and wartime
economic regulations. Other Cabinet members, including such important
people as Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins, virtually never appeared in the AUFBAU 's pages. Here the paper
was reflecting not only its own one-sidedness toward Roosevelt, but the
general trend of a war administration centralized that only the President
himself appeared to speak authoritatively in many matters. 2 ^
25Aug. 1, 39, p. 5; Oct. 3, 41, p. 4; Nov. 7, 41, p. 1; Sep.l, 39, p. 1.
°0n wartime bureaucracy and on the legislature, see Richard Polenberg,
War and Society, New York 1972, pp. 193, 194; about the economy, pp. 154 ff.
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CHAPTER IX
AUFBAU AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY
Although identification with America's political order was very
important for the refugees who sought a new social and political identity,
direct participation in American politics was restricted to the few
refugees who were citizens. For many new immigrants, involvement in
the activities of the American Jewish community offered a helpful
substitute. All Jewish refugees could join American Jewish organiza-
tions. Resettled immigrants who were grateful recipients of aid
offered by American Jewish communities frequently identified with and
rediscovered Judaism as a spiritual home.
1
For many, Judaism probably
became even more important than the emotional bonds they developed to
the political system of their new homeland.
The AUFBAU reflected this tendency in that it promoted an "aufrechtes
and selbs tewusstes Judentum" (upright and self-confident Jewishness) ,
^
a characteristic to which it assigned importance equal to the fostering
of a patriotic spirit among its readers. The paper often contrasted
the relative timelessness and political independence of Judaism with the
time bound course of general politics. A Jewish consciousness was
considered to be a useful means to create cohesiveness among Jews who
had lost their material possessions and their immediate cultural and
3
social identity due to sudden changes on the political scene.
-*-June 8, 40, p. 3; Feb. 23, 40, p. 5; Nov. 40, p. 9.
2
Dec. 34, p.l.
3
In articles on High Holidays throughout the paper, and supplement
"die judische Welt" (The Jewish World) starting Oct. 10, 41, every two weeks.
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In most instances, though, Jews were pictured as an integral part
of American society which had contributed to America's fame and
importance in the past and continued to do so in the present. The
historical commitment of Jews to America was emphasised in numerous
articles such as "Lincoln und die Juden" (Lincoln and the Jews)
,
"Theodore Roosevelt und die Juden," and "Juden in der Kolonialzeit"
(Jews in the colonial age)
,
4
In other instances the achievements of
famous contemporary Jews like Bernard Baruch and Felix Frankfurter were
5
praised
.
The AUFBAU's discussion of American Jews in the context of American
history displayed two peculiarities. For one thing, what the Jewishness
of the famous businessmen and scholars described in the paper consisted
in was never entirely clear. Secondly, only the achievements of
individual Jews were celebrated. The successes of the Jews as an ethnic
group in American society received no emphasis, with the exception of
Jewish participation in wars.
These blind spots were founded in the AUFBAU's and the refugees'
inability to assess the peculiar social and historical situation of
American Jewry. So diverse were the American Jews' cultural backgrounds
that even they had trouble visualizing themselves as a cohesive group.
For a number of reasons the refugees found themselves in a particularly
complicated situation at the end of the 1930s. Up to then, two large
waves of Jewish immigrants had come to the United States. German Jews
^Feb. 16, 40, p. 2; July 18, 41, p. 7; Jan. 19, 40, p.ll.
^Apr. 19, 40, p. 11; June 14, 40, p. 13.
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had immigrated from Southern and Southwestern Germany in numbers at the
middle of the 19th century. Most of them worked their way up from
humble starting positions as small shopkeepers and peddlers in the
United States. By the end of the century a considerable proportion of
them had accumulated wealth and reached a comfortable middle class
. .
6position. German Jews in America established a number of charitable
and political organizations, the most important of which was the American
Jewish Committee, founded in 1906. 7 For a long time Jews of German
extraction dominated Jewish social and political organizations in the
United States. By the 1930s, however, the other large Jewish immigrant
group in this country had reached at least equal political significance
in the American Jewish community. Immigrants from Poland, Russia, and
other eastern European countries who had come to the United States in
great numbers around the turn of the century had swiftly formed their
own organizational bodies, including Jewish labor unions, the American
o
Jewish Congress, and a number of Zionist organizations.
Usually the relationships between the two main segments were not
without tensions. Eastern European Jews were much less westernized in
many ways than their brethren of German extraction; they usually clung
to their old ways of life and their religious beliefs much more
6
Eric Hirshler, Jews From Germany in the United States
,
New York
1955, pp. 34-88. Stephen Birmingham's "Our Crowd ", New York, 1967, tells
the story of the upper class German Jews in New York City.
7
Maurice Karpf, Jewish Community Organization in the United States
New York, 1938, pp. 63ff.; see also Naomi Cohen Not Free to Desist: the
American Jewish Committee 1906-1966
,
Philadelphia 1972.
O
Karpf, pp. 63 ff.
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rigorously. Often enough, German-Jewish entrepreneurs had exploited
eastern European Jews as cheap laborers when they had first come to
the United States.
9
Refugees were caught between the two groups in a special way.
In most respects they resembled the old German-Jewish immigrants,
especially in their middle class background and their assimilated
culture. On the other hand, most refugees were not too readily accepted
by the status conscious "German American" Jews but depended mostly on
the help of the largely eastern European Jewish charities. The efforts
of these agencies to help the refugees were often accompanied by
frictions which were rooted in the deeply seated prejudices of many
German Jews against "Russian" Jews and vice versa. Refugees from
Germany also had difficulties in accepting the segregated way of life
and the religious orthodox of many of the Eastern European Jews in
10
America
.
The AUFBAU avoided open discussion of these differences between
eastern and western Jews, at least in the pre-war years, and only
occasionally indicated that such frictions actually existed. 11 At
times the editors emphasized that a harmonious relationship between the
two groups was possible through articles about personal encounters with
9
Very little direct information on this topic can be found. See
Zosa Szajkowski, "The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees," in
American Jewish. Historical Quarterly
,
Dec. 1971, pp. 103-105, 132/133.
Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsche Emigration in den USA, 1933-1945
,
Dusseldorf, 1971, p. 139.
^March 8, 40, p. 3; Apr. 1, 39, p. 8; Apr. 15, 39, p. 5.
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helpful and understanding eastern European Jews. 12 In another instance,
when the paper tried to inform its readers about the Yiddish press,
the tone of the writing only highlighted the distance between the two
communities .
^
In the war years the paper undertook more open discussion of
problems related to the acculturation of refugees within American Jewry.
The best analysis in this respect was offered by a refugee. Rabbi Max
Nussbaum, in a speech before the Jewish Club of Los Angeles in 1943.
Nussbaum emphasized that refugees were in a difficult social position as
new Jewish immigrants. They were looked upon with suspicion by both
German Jews and eastern European Jews. But refugees, Nussbaum concluded,
were themselves partly to blame for the slow pace of their integration
into American Jewry, because few newcomers made decided efforts to join
American Jewish organizations. Indirectly the paper confirmed this
impression in a series of articles entitled "Jewish Congregations in
New York City." The series portrayed only refugee congregations, most
of which counted no Americans among their members. Some were almost
exactly modeled after specific congregations in Germany."^
Although the paper was able to talk openly about the ethnic
12May 3, 41, p. 12; Nov. 7, 41, p. 3.
13July 25, 41, p. 4.
14
Feb. 5, 43, p. 14; Oct. 22, 43, p. 5.
Series starts Sep. 11, 42, p. 22; see also Alexander Carlebach,
"The German Jewish Immigration and Its Influence on Synagogue Life in
the USA (1933-1942)," in Leo Baeck Yearbook 1964
,
pp. 351-372.
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diversity among
into the issues
Americans by 1943, it could offer no analytical Insights
but continued to urge American Jewish organizations to
show more cooperation and solidarity in view of the crisis of world
Jewry. This lack of interest in the historical and sociological
foundations of the differences within American Jewry was founded in
the AUFBAU predominant concern with the fate of European Jewry at that
time. The concern with European affairs was so overwhelming that from
the beginning the AUFBAU had judged the actions of American Jewish
organizations almost exclusively on the basis of their efforts to fight
Nazism and anti-Semitism. In the early years of the paper, when the
most active members were former German Zionists, American Jewish organ-
izations were most often violently attacked from a Zionist standpoint. 16
The activities of American Jewish organizations were, as a whole, deemed
insufficient, although the AUFBAU supported their boycotts and mass
meetings. The early AUFBAU particularly condemned the American Jewish
Committee, which preferred appeals to national and international
political figures and organizations to mass actions. American Jewish
organizations were accused of forming an upper class establishment that
was alienated from the real needs of suffering Jews. The paper also
observed, correctly, that the hesitant attitude of some American Jewish
organizations in regard to the refugee problem was rooted in the fear
that too vigorous action in behalf of Jews abroad would endanger the
status of American Jews at home. 1 ^
1 f)
Apr. 35, pp. 5/6; Apr. 36, pp. 1/2.
1
^Apr. 35, pp. 6/7; June 35, p. 5; Sep. 36, p. 2; Oct. 36, p. 1;
Feb. 37, p. 2; Szajkowski, pp. 103-112.
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The determination with which the small German-Jewish Club attacked
the powerful American Jewish organizations
,
including the Zionist groups,
stood in stark contrast to the negligible influence the Club had within
the American Jewish community. But, as paper and club became the
representative voices of the newly arriving refugees of the late thirties,
their attitude towards American Jewish organizations softened perceptively
And by the beginning of the war the AUFBAU agreed with most American
organizations that the fate of European Jewry was being decided mainly
on the battlefields of Europe. Although events in Palestine continued
to be of great interest in the paper, its main concern shifted to helping
those Jews who were caught in Europe. The AUFBAU and the German-Jewish
Club launched a number of charity activities. Several refugee organiza-
tions like the American Federation of German Jews and the German-
American Congress for Democracy emphasized the special concerns of the
1
8
European Jews who had escaped the Nazi onslaught.
The nearly complete cutoff of escape routes for refugees after
Pearl Harbor, and especially the knowledge from November 1942 of the
systematic extermination of Jews by the Nazis, increased American Jewry's
concern about the fate of European Jews. The AUFBAU joined the bulk of
American Jewish organizations in 1942 in calling for immediate and
unified actions by all Jews in America. Mass rallies, protest strikes,
and nation-wide prayers prompted by the news about the extermination
19
program were seen as manifestations of this emerging solidarity.
^Feb. 2, 40, p. 5; Feb. 28, 41, p. 4; July 4, 41, p. 3.
^July 17, 41, p. 1; March 5, 43, p. 1; July 16, 43, p. 13.
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An important event designed to unite American Jewry was the
American Jewish Conference, initiated in early 1943 by the B'nai B'rith.
After a year of preparations and maneuvering, the conference finally
took place in September 1943 in New York City. The 501 delegates who
had been elected by Jewish communities and organizations all over the
country were supposedly representative of all parts of American Jewry.
Even the American Federation of Jews from Central Europe was allowed to
send three delegates to the conference, as the AUFBAU recorded with
. ,
20
pride
.
American Zionist organizations, however, had arranged to use this
conference as a means of committing American Jewry to an independent
Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. Until then, many Jewish organizations
had not espoused this aim. But Zionist groups had secured a majority
of the delegate seats and, under the pressure of the worldwide political
situation, the Palestine statehood resolutions went through nearly
unanimously. But, a month later, the American Jewish Committee declared
its open dissent against the outcome of the conference and a number of
other Jewish groups that had joined the conference decided to remain
. , .
21
neutral on the issue.
The AUFBAU recorded the unfolding of the American Jewish Conference
extensively, but avoided any comment about the Zionist's efforts to use
the convention for their own ends. Although the results of the confer-
ence brought no help whatever to the persecuted Jews in Europe, the
on
June 18, 43, p. 7; July 9, 43, p. 1.
21 Samuel Halperin, The Political World of American Zionism , Detroit
1961, ch. 9 passim.
103
AUFBAU had its own reasons for thinking that the meeting had been
valuable. For one thing, the paper believed that such a conference
had finally achieved at least a temporary unity of action among American
Jews. This was considered to be a vital basis upon which to build any
further actions. In addition, the unity of American Jews would also
facilitate the participation and acceptance of refugees in American
22
Jewish organizations. Consequently, the AUFBAU joined in the wide-
spread condemnation of the American Jewish Committee's dissent from
23the results of the conference.
It was only too evident, though, that the conference and most other
actions of American Jewish organizations had brought no change in the
situation of European Jews. The AUFBAU expressed its frustration about
this fact only in a very subdued way. For the most part, through 1944,
24
it simply avoided the extermination issue. The paper continued to
declare that the most effective way for the refugees to fight the Nazis
25
was through active participation in the war on the side of the Allies.
To be sure, though, the concentration on problems of foreign policy
did not solve the everyday problems of refugees who had to find some way
of accommodating themselves within the different groups and sections of
American Jewry. This issue remained particularly crucial for those
22
May 15, 42, p. 3; July 23, 43, p. 1; Sep. 3, 43, p. 1; Sep. 10, 43, p
230ct. 29
,
43
» p. 1; Nov. 5, 43, p. 4.
24Nov
.
5, 43, P- CMi-H
25Nov. 5, 43, P- 15; Jan. 14, 44, p . 1.
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refugees who had no explicit religious or political affiliations to
American Jewry. To what ethnic group in American society could they
look for help?
105
CHAPTER X
GERMAN AMERICANS AND THE REFUGEES
Non-Jewish German Americans, with their tightly knit Vereinsleben
(club life) and their family and food centered culture, seemingly
offered much of what the German refugees were missing in the United
States. Indeed, German Americans and German Jewish refugees had many
interests in common; both formed a wide variety of clubs where they
fulfilled their love for music and discussed cultural and political
topics. Sports activities also were important in the life of both
communities
.
Yet association between the old and the new immigrants from
Germany was rare, and hostile feelings, especially on the side of the
refugees towards the German Americans, seem to have prevailed. The
tensions very likely originated in the different circumstances under
which German-Americans and German Jewish refugees had come to the
United States. While most of the older German American immigrants had
left Germany for economic reasons and still identified with German
culture, refugees were more ambiguous about their German past because
of their experiences under the Nazis. The closeness of German American
ethnic culture to some of the things the refugees wanted to leave behind
increased their reservations toward German ethnic groups in this country.
The AUFBAU expressed these feelings rather clearly. Though refugees
had contacts with German Americans in many ways, especially in New York
City, they generally denounced German Americans as Nazis or old fashioned,
unpolitical wurst eaters and Kaiser admirers. The AUFBAU was never
entirely able to overcome such stereotyped views of German
immigrants.
106
German immigration to the United States began around 1800. Before
the Civil War, most of these settlers, who were mainly farmers and
craftsmen, struck roots in Pennsylvania and Ohio.
1
The first wave of
political immigrants, actually the earliest group of German refugees,
came in the wake of the 1848 revolution in Germany. Among those who
immigrated to the United States to escape political persecution were
2
many well known radicals of the 48 movement.
A third large group of German immigrants followed in the 1870s and
1880s. Most of these newcomers were industrial or agricultural workers;
some were socialists and labor organizers who fled the country during
3
Bismarck's suppression of the socialist party in Germany. The 48ers
as well as the later immigrants quickly developed into a well organized
ethnic group. The extensive German language press and the numerous
Gesangs-and and Turnvereine (glee clubs and gymnastic societies) brought
German Americans together in their leisure time and kept alive the
ideas of German liberalism and socialism.
By the beginning of the 20th century, when immigration from Germany
had levelled off, German Americans, by then most heavily settled in the
Midwest were one of the most vocal and best organized ethnic groups
1
Carl Wittke, We Who Built America , Cleveland, 1967, p. 188.
^Ibid., pp. 189-195.
^Ibid., pp. 238-241.
^Wolfgang Kollermann and Peter Marschalck, "German Emigration to
the United States," in: Perspectives in American History , Harvard
University Press, Fall 1973, pp. 544, 546.
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in the United States. Although most of their organizations had by
then lost their political flavor and were purely social clubs,'*
German Americans tended to act in a unified way where politics were
concerned. They voted strongly against prohibition candidates, the
prohibition laws, and women's suffrage (because of its connection with
prohibition)
,
and they supported Wilson and his isolationist policies
£
in the 1914 and 1916 elections.
But World War I saw an unprecedented outbreak of anti-German feeling
in the United States which manifested itself in open attacks on German
Americans, judicial persecution of many who were supposedly disloyal,
and a ban on everything associated with German culture. The German
American community had openly favored the German cause at the beginning
of the war, but it remained loyal to the United States after American
entry into the war. Nevertheless, the German Americans and their
organized life as an ethnic community never really recovered from the
fears and suppressions of World War I.
The 1920s saw yet another wave of German immigrants trying their
luck in the New World. This time it was an economic and only indirectly
politically influenced movement of almost half a million Germans.
Most of them were craftsmen, skilled industrial workers, or farm laborers
^Wittke, pp. 212-217.
^Harold Furer, The Germans in America , Dobbs Ferry, New York 1973,
p. 71; Walter Nugent, The Tolerant Populists , Chicago 1963, pp.
71/72.
^Marschalck/Kollermann, p. 546; Furer, p. 74.
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who had left a troubled Germany. Their discontent with political and
economic conditions in postwar Germany may have been related to their
generally more conservative attitudes. These new German Americans did
not have any significant impact on the surviving German American
organizations. The only new German American organization of any
importance that emerged in the twenties was the Steuben Society,
founded in 1919. Under its leader, New York school commissioner
Theodore Huebener, it wanted to revive interest in German high culture
q
and the German liberal tradition.
The only organizations in which the recent German immigrants played
a notable role were a number of German American fascist groups which
sprang up in the 1930s; particularly The Friends of the New Germany and
the Amerikadeutscher Volksbund (German-American Bund) . These groups
propagandized for the Third Reich, portraying it as a rebirth of
Germany's glorious cultural tradition and political power. The most
notorious of them was undoubtedly the German-American Bund, founded in
1936 and led by Fritz Kuhn. At its high point, the Bund probably had
25,000 members (most of them in the New York City area). The Bund
claimed, and the public believed, that the National Socialists in
Germany supported it as a sister organization and regarded it as the
spearhead of the National Socialist revolution in the United States.
The German government, however, considered Kuhn's imitation storm
troopers merely an embarassment which threatened its policy of detente
8Marschalck/Kollermann, p. 546.
^Furer, p. 75.
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towards the United States. It supported the Bund only hesitantly in
its early years with some propaganda material. And in the late thirties
all connections to Kuhn were cut off. The Bund eventually dissolved
when Kuhn was jailed in 1940; its political position had become
virtually untenable after the war had started.
Even though the Bund never counted a large number of the German
Americans among its followers, the American public as well as the AUFBAU
believed some of the propaganda of this organization. They suspected
that a systematic subversion of the United States by the National Social-
ists was underway and that the Bund and similar establishments were the
harbingers of this movement. These fears were intensified after 1939 by
suspicions that Germany had a complex and sophisticated network of
agents and spies operating in the United States in order to prepare the
11
country for a Nazi takeover.
Postwar historical research on the subject has proved that an
organized fifth column did not exist in the form suspected by American
12
public opinion. All in all, the propaganda attempts of the Nazis in
the United States were restricted to the dissemination of literature.
These efforts involved such official agencies as the German consulate
10Sander F. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States , Ithaca,
New York 1974, p, 222.
''''''Information on the 5th column appears in the AUFBAU series "The
5th Column in California," throughout 1942/1943, and in Oetje John
Rogge, The Official German Report , New York 1961.
1 0
The 5th column was first shown to have been largely a myth by
Louis DeJong, The German 5th Column in the Second World War, New
York
1956.
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in New York City and the German railroad information bureau. The
activities of these organizations were coordinated by World War I
propaganda veteran George Sylvester Viereck and German diplomatic
13
officials. At times, Viereck and his co-workers even managed to
contact some isolationist congressmen. Whether their efforts left any
impact on these politicians or the rest of the American public is not
known .
^
For the first five years of its existence, AUFBAU consistently
depicted German Americans as fascists, Nazis, or Jew haters. Although
only a small number of German Americans were active supporters of
Hitler or any fascist movements at all, the AUFBAU felt threatened by
every sneeze from right wing German Americans. The AUFBAU' s apprehensions,
unsubstantiated though they look today, did constitute a prime example
of a distortion in the AUFBAU' s perspective on American society, a
distortion caused by the exigencies of the refugees in this country.
One of the main attacks of the AUFBAU against German Americans was
directed at the New Yorker Staatszeitung , a German language newspaper
dating back to 1834. In the 1930s the Staatszeitung was the largest
German language publication in the country, and one of only twelve
remaining German dailies.^ It had the reputation of being restrained
^Klaus Kipphan, Deutsch Propaganda in den Vereinigten Staaten
1933-1941
,
Heidelberg 1971, especially conclusion, pp. 207-212.
^Niel M. Johnson, George Sylvester Viereck, German-American
Propagandist
,
Urbana, Illinois 1972, ch. VII.
•*-^Carl Wittke, The German Language Press in America , University of
Kentucky Press 1957, p. 282.
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in its general opinions and political views. The AUFBAU, however,
constantly attacked the paper for its alleged anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi
1
6
attitudes
. The AUFBAU 's examples of the Staatszeitung 1 s supposed
anti-Semitism at most show the Staatszeitung 1 s hesitant and ambivalent
attitude towards Hitler's Germany and the refugees in the United States.
For the AUFBAU, this was enough to show that the Staatszeitung lent
itself to Nazi propaganda. Although the AUFBAU continuously warned
its readers not to touch the Staatszeitung
,
it was read by refugees and
subscribed to by refugee organizations.^
The same attitudes of the AUFBAU prevailed towards most people and
businesses in Yorkville, the most heavily German American section of
Manhattan. Yorkville, the paper contended, was infested with Nazi
18
activities. Not only did its German inhabitants openly express their
sympathies for the Nazi cause, but German Americans there were also
systematically used by Nazi agents in the United States for their
destructive ends. In the impending Nazi takeover which the AUFBAU
feared in the thirties, German Americans, with the help of the fatherland,
would play the dominant role. Native American fascism was only seen as
16
AU Sep. 35, pp. 8/9; Dec. 35, pp. 5/6; Apr. 36, p. 1; June 37,
pp. 1/2; Dec. 22, 39, p. 20; Apr. 19, 40, p. 2; June, 14, 40, p. 4.
17
July 3, 42, p. 5.
^Refugees a t Work , by Sophia Robison et al. (see Chapter 5, p. )
found that Yorkville was one of the favorite locations for refugees who
set up businesses of their own. Of all parts of Manhattan, only the
upper West side had more (96) refugee businesses than Yorkville (70) .
Ibid
. ,
p . 40
.
19
May 17, 40, p. 2; Dec. 27, 40, p. 4; Jan 23, 41, p. 4.
112
a minute force in this context.
These attitudes closely resembled the anti-German attitudes in
the United States during World War I. Interestingly enough, the AUFBAU
modified its stand towards German Americans when anti-German feelings
in general became more manifest in the United States. With the
outbreak of World War II, refugees became aware of the fact that they
too were considered Germans and consequently were classified as "enemy
aliens" by the government and by a suspicious public. Clearly, a witch
hunt for German Americans was not in the interest of any group of
German immigrants .
^
During the war, then, the AUFBAU printed articles that depicted
22
German Americans as a loyal but largely unpolitical group. German
Americans were not too dangerous anymore, but even their non-political
attitude drew critical and patronizing remarks from the AUFBAU. The
paper reckoned that German Americans, in their isolated existence as a
separate ethnic group, had lost touch with German as well as with
American political realities. Time had stood still for them since
sometime before World War I. This idea of the provincial, politically
retarded, petit bourgeois German American was not a flattering portrait.
But it seems to have been partly true, even though the basis of this
provincialism was more complex than the AUFBAU suspected. The paper did
not recognize, for example, that the anti-German
hysteria of World War I
200n anti-German feeling in the United States
see Charles Stember
et al. Jews in the Mind of America , New York
1968, p. 1 9.
21 Sep . 11, 42, p. 40; the paper warned
its readers to suspect a
spy in every foreign looking or sounding
person.
22Nov. 1, 41, p. 9; Jan. 30, 42,
p. 2.
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was reason enough for many German Americans to avoid any political
involvement as an ethnic group.
But there were German Americans of whom the AUFBAU was very proud,
because they had attained important positions in American politics in
the 1930 's. People like Wendell Willkie and Robert F. Wagner were
hailed and portrayed in much the same manner as famous American Jews.
These prominent German Americans deserved admiration not only for
their power and their capabilities as public figures, but also because
they had succeeded in shedding their ethnicity and had become successful
23
Americans. In other words, for the AUFBAU the best German American
was the one who could no longer be identified as a German American.
Only at one point, for the AUFBAU, did identification with one's
national origin become important, even necessary, for German Americans;
that was in the fight against fascism and Nazism. In the AUFBAU'
s
view, German Americans, just like Jews, had a special stake in fighting
against Hitler and for the preservation of democracy. But up to the late
war years, the paper contended that German Americans largely failed to
rise to that responsibility. Few Germap. Americans, other than recent
immigrants, had joined anti-fascist organizations in the United States.
Of all German American groups, the AUFBAU maintained connections only
with old time German socialist movements. And even those groups were
23Dec . 15, 39, p. 8; Jan. 30, 42, p. 5.
24
Nov. 1, 41, p. 1; Jan. 30, 42, p. 5.
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0 cby then largely dominated by recent immigrants. Some liberal minded
German Americans might have read the AUFBAU
,
the paper freely admitted
26
at one point, and a number of them might have joined the small,
27
anti-Nazi Loyal Americans of German Descent. But actually nothing
came of the AUFBAU' s idea that German Americans should fight together
28in the front ranks against fascism.
The AUFBAU' s views on German Americans show a contradictory position
toward an ethnic group which was very similar to the refugees. On the
one hand, German Americans were criticized for their lack of assimilation
and their clanishness; on the other hand, they were scolded when they
were not able to show the cohesiveness of an ethnic group in the fight
against fascism. This split consciousness reflected the situation of
the refugees themselves in many respects. After all, most refugees had
a cultural heritage similar to that of the German Americans. They spoke
the same language and showed the same love for literature and music. How
29
much of this could they sacrifice for the sake of Americanization? Had
America enough to offer to make up for this loss?
25Gerhard Seger, editor of the social democratic weekly Neue
Volkszeitung
,
sometimes wrote articles for the AUFBAU (e.g., Nov. 1, 41,
p. 9), his paper was advertised frequently in the AUFBAU, and
some
members of the social democratic exile wrote for the AUFBAU regularly
(Weichmann and Aufhauser)
.
^June 14, 41, p. 4.
2
^Aug. 1, 41, p. 5; Dec. 11, 42, p. 4; Jan. 11, 43, p.
4.
2
^Kipphan, pp. 195-199.
^Concerning the preservation of German culture and language.
March 27, 42, p. 32; Apr. 11, 41, p. 7; Apr. 18, 41, p.
7.
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CHAPTER XI
AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE AUFBAU-
-PROPAGANDA OR ART?
Although the AUFBAU was published through the 1930s, it provided
no real coverage of American cultural life until early 1939. And only
at the end of that year did regular features on art and literature
appear in the paper. 1 Consequently, the AUFBAU 's assessments of
American culture emerged in the war years, a time of relatively stagnant
development. Despite this limitation, the AUFBAU' s treatment of
popular and high culture does offer valuable insight into the refugees'
perspective on America's cultural life.
The earliest regular arts features in the AUFBAU dealt with movies
and how and where they were made. Throughout the war years, extensive
articles about films continued as a regular feature of the paper. By
1940 the AUFBAU printed a bi-monthly column of news from Hollywood
("Hollywood Calling..") and two to four movie reviews each week. The
critiques and columns were usually written by such competent authors
2
as Hans Kafka and Ernst Lubitsch. Many reports in the AUFBAU explained
how the Hollywood dream factories functioned; sometimes the paper
discussed the social lives of actors and producers as well as the
3
artistic and political aspects of moviemaking.
XApr . 15, 39, p. 2; May 1, 39, p. 16; May 15, 39, p. 14.
^Emigre film experts are discussed by Kafka, Dec. 22, 44, pp. 40ff.
^May 1, 39, p. 16 (Hollywood's political position); July 1, 39,
p. 4; Nov. 1, 39, p. 15; June 6, 41, p. 15; May 29, 42, p.
17.
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Theatre events were reported from early in the paper's existence.
But, for the most part, the AUFBAU ' s theatre news focused on the special
interests of the refugee community. Reports told of a refugee actor
or actress starting a new career on Broadway, the WPA theatre staging
a German language play, the initial presentation in English translation
of a refugee writer's play, or a Yiddish drama on the fate of refugees.
4
Of all stage events, only Yiddish theatre and musicals received regular
coverage. Other plays were only irregularly reviewed, and those dis-
cussed usually did not reveal a representative picture of the American
theatre
.
^
Musicals . Much the same selectivity occurred in regard to musicals.
This child of the European operette had grown mostly in American
cultural soil. The 1930s had been a fruitful time for musical comedies,
and by the end of that decade the musical had won a prominent place on
the American stage. Yet the AUFBAU never really paid much attention
to the popular American musical. Only Yiddish productions were
reviewed extensively. The few German light operas tried on this side
of the Atlantic, though, were much celebrated by the paper.
Classical Music . The same dominant concern with the more European
forms of the arts showed in the AUFBAU' s coverage of classical music.
4
Dec. 11, 42, p. 11; Dec. 15, 39, p. 9.
^May 36, p. 5; June 5, 42, p. 4; Nov. 5, 42, p. 11; Oct. 15, 4_>, p.
12
^Nov. 14, 41, p. 11; Sep. 4, 42, p. 10.
7
June 14, 43, p. 9; Nov. 6, 42, p. 10.
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By the end of 1939 frequent reviews of concerts and operas began to
appear, and soon the paper had a musical editor (Arthur Holde) who
regularly filled a page with reviews and articles about musical events.
As many European musicians were performing mainly in the United
8
States by 1940, the AUFBAU's music pages read almost like those in any
German paper before 1933. Indeed, the great number of European artists
provided such excellent performances of classical and contemporary
music (including opera) that the sparse American musical life led only
a negligible existence, hardly noticed by the AUFBAU . Only black
American performers of European classical music appeared worthy of
9
notice for the paper. American popular music (including jazz)
received practically no recognition. All in all, the AUFBAU published
a music page that catered to the tastes of middle class refugees from
Germany and Austria. New York's role as the provisional world capital
of the arts during World War II made it possible for the AUFBAU to
preserve the central European perspective of its readers.
Literature. Literary pages which did not become a regular
feature of the AUFBAU until 1940, retained an uneven quality throughout
the war years. American literature was discussed only in summary
articles that dealt with one literary epoch or style--rarely more than
100 lines at a time.
10
Reviews of American books were extremely rare,
^This topic is surveyed in Dec. 22, 44, pp. 49ff.; June 26, 42, p.
^Charles Alexander, Nationalism in American Life , Chicago 1969, p.
100ct. 2, 42, p. 8, first article of "Gestalten
Amerikanischer
Literatur," it continues irregularly throughout 1943/44; also Oct. 1,
39, p. 6.
11 .
209.
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and background information about literary trends and the reading public
did not appear at all until 1944.
11
The paper s discussion of German literature more than conpensated
for its negligence concerning American writing. As the AUFBAU became
more and more the voice of the intellectual immigration, it commenced
to serve as a forum for emigre^ writers, poets, and journalists. The
literary scene of the German exile was reflected not only in book
reviews, portraits, and news about writers; but much original emigre
writing first appeared in the AUFBAU. Thus the literature pages, along
with the music pages, were among the best features of the AUFBAU,
features upon which much of its enduring fame as an exile paper was
founded.
^
The AUFBAU' s curious neglect of American literature very likely
had its origin in the new immigrants' limited access to the English
language. Language problems always posed problems to the refugees in
everyday life. Furthermore, many Europeans looked on American writing
as of secondary importance.
Journalism . The paper knew very well that American culture
consisted of more than Hollywood movies. Yet, instead of studying
American literature or music, it recommended that refugees become
acquainted with the more typical products of American popular culture.
They should read comic strips and the syndicated columns, and listen
^''"Bucher und Leser in Amerika" (Books and the Reading Public in
America) starts in the Summer of 1944.
'^A survey of this topic is in Dec. 22, 44, p. 47; Dec 29, 44, pp.
2/3
Aug 7, 42, p. 1/5.
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to the popular radio shows, and thus get to know the cultural elements
that were part of every American's life. For the AUFBAU
,
American
journalism and radio entertainment were important not only because of
their didactic function for the newcomer, but also because their formal
perfection made them equal to traditional kinds of art. Discussion
about comic strips, and highly enthusiastic comments about columnists
and radio entertainers, made clear to the European reader that in the
New World journalism was a highly sophisticated expression of social
and cultural life, even though it appealed not to an intellectual elite
but to a mass audience. Despite the fact that in European terms this
was a negative characteristic, for the AUFBAU these types of mass
culture provided most useful instruments for Americanization of the
13
refugee. Meanwhile, the more traditional forms of the arts,
classical music, and literature remained in the non- judgmental area of
l'art pour l'art .
But what kind of values should American culture teach the new
immigrant? A close analysis shows that the most frequently used terms
that supposedly expressed American virtues for the AUFBAU coincided
with the vocabulary of American war propaganda: Freedom and Democracy,
the preservation of individual liberties, and the voluntary solidarity
of a nation preserving these traditions. Of particular importance for
the immigrant was the emphasis on an egalitarian society which allowed
everybody, regardless of his background, race, or creed, to participate
13Feb 28, 40, p. 9; Oct 18, 40, p. 3; Apr 15, 39, p. 2; July 4, 40,
p. 7; July 11, 40. p. 24.
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in this comprehensive effort.
The worth of most American literary and artistic products was
measured by how well they seemed to disseminate these American virtues.
The paper's treatment of American literature offers a prime example of
this ideological viewpoint. "Gestalten Amerikanischer Literatur," a
regular feature throughout 1943 and 1944, reviewed the American literary
scene from Thomas Paine to John Steinbeck, William Saroyan, and John Dos
14
Passos. The writer of this series revealed a rather one -dimensional
understanding of American literature. Writers of the 19th century were
judged mainly on the strength of their social commitments as expressed
through their books. Thus Harriet Beecher Stowe, though generally
considered naive, was highly praised for her abolitionist stand; but
James Fenimore Cooper's pioneer stories were discredited because they
celebrated Rousseau's ideal of the innocent individual who defies
collective action.
15
Likewise, the popular contemporary writers Thomas
Wolfe, William Faulkner, and William Saroyan, were disqualified as
individualistic romantics. Steinbeck, Dos Passos, and especially
Hemingway, on the other hand, were celebrated for their humanistic
and masculine (!) portraits of American society.
Many of the AUFBAU's film reviews followed much the same course.
The most American movie, one e/ery immigrant ought to see, was The
Grapes of Wrath . Early film critiques supported the notion that Hollywood
should not simply be a dream factory, but should also offer an outlet
14
Dec 10, 43, p. 15; Dec 24, 43, p. 15.
^March 19, 43, p. 10; Oct. 16, 42, p. 7.
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for social criticism in its films. 16 But as the war approached,
movies became less perceptive of social reality and conflict, and most
of them either retreated into individual romance or proclaimed a blunt
patriotism. In parallel fashion, AUFBAU film reviews became less
critical. Most extensively reviewed were war movies. Considering the
usual low quality of these Hollywood products, the paper's criticism
was sparse and without perspective. Occasionally, the film critic
would take issue with a too mellow portrait of the Nazis or the glamorous
view of the war in general. ^ The melodramatic accounts of solidarity
and the glorification of group life were what made these movies so
valuable to the AUFBAU. These pictures, it was thought, would give
the spectator on the homefront a clearer view of what the nation was
fighting for and how well it did its job. In line with most of the
American public, the paper maintained that Hollywood did its best to
convey wartime reality to the masses. Entertainment movies were usually
judged much more severely by the AUFBAU, and the reviews had a tendency
to condemn lightweight features as unrealistic in time of an international
18
crisis.
A number of background reports analyzed and approved the influence
of Hollywood in mobilizing the public spirit for the war effort. The
difference between the cooperation of Hollywood's moviemakers and the
centralized propaganda machines of the fascist powers was seen to lie
16jan 24, 41, p. 11; May 2, 41, p. 9; Nov. 14, 42, p. 9; March 26, 43, p. 1-
17Feb 12, 43, p. 9; Dec 3, 43, p. 12; Jan 14, 44, p. 21.
18July 24, 42, p. 22; March 26, 43, p. 11.
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mainly in the voluntary nature of Hollywood's contribution as well as
in the inherently good aims for which the Allies were fighting. What
these aims were, precisely, is not found in either the movies or the
19
reviews. Not only the concerted yet voluntary effort of the
media and the arts, but also the diversity of artistic expression
impressed the AUFBAU
. Unlike oppressed Europe, America prescribed no
mold into which all forms of art had to fit. Throughout the country,
but especially in metropolitan New York, many ethnic groups had been able
to retain their special form of artistic expression. The AUFBAU's
interest in New York's ethnically diverse cultural scene shows clearly
20in articles about Chinese theatre, Indian art, and Negro music.
Most prominent among the different ethnic arts were Yiddish theatre
and musical comedy. The AUFBAU reviewed almost every Yiddish stage
event in town and published numerous portraits of the stars of the
21
Yiddish stage. This is surprising since German Jews were traditionally
unfamiliar with this form of folkloristic art preserved by Eastern
European Jews. The majority of the refugees did not even understand
Yiddish. Probably the AUFBAU editors had reason to believe that
Yiddish theatre was nevertheless attractive to German speaking refugees
because this was the closest thing to German language theater that was
^Ken Jones and Arthur McClure, Hollywood at War , New York 1973,
pp. 15-24, esp. p. 22, confirms this impression, one that one could
also gather from the AUFBAU's film reviews.
20
July 26, 40, p. 3; Sep. 27, 40, p. 3; Feb 27, 41, p. 10; Sep 4,
42, p. 10.
21
Sep 4, 42, p. 12; Jan 15, 43, p. 12; Jan 22, 43, p. 12; Oct 1,
43, p. 16; Nov 19, 43, p. 13.
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22
available
.
When the AUFBAU looked beyond the melting pot situation of the
urban centers, it saw most forms of the popular arts as mass fabricated
products. This was considered to be an inherently positive character-
istic of the popular arts in America. A mass audience for such
products as movies, radio shows, syndicated newspaper columns, and
comic strips could serve a massive educational effort. Moreover, the
infinite reproductibility of popular culture also meant infinite
accesibility of cultural values and expressions to everybody, including
the refugees. The egalitarianism of popular culture was therefore
seen as a value built into the American democratic system which made
solidarity, heightened public consciousness, and maturity possible for
everybody, immigrant and native American alike.
During the war years the uniformity of cultural products increased.
Lack of critical consciousness became clearly noticeable in the AUFBAU,
as in the American press generally. But, unlike the American press,
the AUFBAU kept a special refugee where the immigrants' critical and
speculative minds could survive. European art, far away, yet utterly
familiar, continued to be the subject of subtle reflection and heated
discussion on the paper's pages. Here values and forms of the arts could
be criticized and questioned openly. These debates were meaningful to
their readers because the relationships they had to music, theatre, and
literature still defined much of their middle class consciousness.
22Joachim Radkau, Die Deutsche Emigration in den USA , Dusseldorf
1972, p. 137.
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Their exile situation and the small audiences many emigre artists
had did provide some positive effects. Artists and intellectuals enjoyed
liberties and experienced new influences they could not have had in
the Europe of the 1930s. Yet they also missed the massive acclamation
of the European middle class. The comparatively small audience of
refugees, on the other hand, was privileged by this situation. They
could participate in most cultural events of the exile as their paper,
the AUFBAU, successfully played the role of active mediator of the free
European arts. The paper thus offered a special means of survival in
an inherently alien, mass produced cultural forest of Hollywood movies
and syndicated columns. For the refugees it provided a buffer to the
harshest forms of the cultural shock.
The culture pages of the AUFBAU, though not so different in
appearance from those of the New York Times
,
had a very special function.
In no way did they ever wish to reflect the American cultural scene as
observed by American contemporaries or historians. To the AUFBAU, art
in America was only noteworthy if it fulfilled its primary task of
Americanizing the refugee. Accordingly, .many parts of the American
cultural scene were overlooked because they were not useful for this
purpose. American literature, theatre, and popular music, as well as
such pursuits as architecture and dance, did not appear. In the more
European "Kultur" part of the paper the refugee could foster his love
for largely non-didactic and complex forms of cultural life.
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CHAPTER XII
AUFBAU FIGHTS THE WAR
After 1939, not only the cultural pages, but most features of
the AUFBAU were overshadowed by the events of the war. For the German
refugees the Second World War began with Hitler's invasion of Poland.
An existential fear for the survival of the free world shaped the
refugees' perspective on foreign and domestic news long before official
American involvement in the war.
This anxiety also lay behind the paper's strong internationalist
and interventionist position in foreign affairs. The official neutrality
of the United States between 1939 and 1941 was only a label without
much meaning for the AUFBAU. Throughout the pre-war years the editors
professed their approval of what they considered to be Roosevelt's
open support of the Allied powers. In the elections of 1940 the President
was hailed as the saviour of the free world, while the activities of
the isolationist politicians were condemned as subversive. Their
"America First" policies were only disguised support for the Axis, the
1
AUFBAU proclaimed.
The paper observed with great satisfaction the government's early
attempts to reorganize the American economy for the production of war
materials. Frequent reports on the Lend Lease Bill and the increasing
production of war material tor the Allies underscored the AUFBAU'
s
approval of the United States support of the Western powers. The
resulting improvement in the American economic situation received only
1
Feb. 2, 40, p. 4; Dec. 2, 40, pp. 1/2.
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secondary emphasis in the paper. 2
As early as 1940 the AUFBAU began to take part in building up a
strong homefront commitment against Hitler. Refugees were advised to
register for defense work, or, if possible to enlist in the army.
Civilian defense preparations also became a focus of attention well
before Pearl Harbor. (Unlike the army, civilian defense did allow
foreigners to participate.) This was considered to be a particularly
useful activity for refugees who wanted to prove their willingness to
fight the fascist threat.^
So AUFBAU readers were well prepared when the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor brought the United States fully into the war. The AUFBAU 's
coverage of war events increased in amount and in quality, but no change
of opinion occurred on any fundamental question. The paper remained
predominately concerned with events on the Atlantic front, but the
situation on the homefront received rather accurate and extensive
attention during the war. But the influence the war showed on American
domestic affairs was seen not so much from a political perspective as
from the viewpoint of the worker, the consumer, the soldier, and the
urban dweller.
The AUFBAU did not provide coverage of the basic functioning of the
war administration agencies, a fact which made it particularly difficult
to get a coherent picture of the changed inteplay between legislature
^ay 17, 40, pp. 1/2; May 24, 40, pp. 1&3; July 5, 40, p. 4;
Sep. 27, 40, p. 2; Jan. 17, 41, p. 1, Jan. 31, 41, p. 1; Apr. 18, 41, p.
2.
^Apr. 25, 41, pp. 1&3.
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and executive during the war. The paper had never held Congress in
particular esteem anyway, but its struggles with burgeoning Roosevelt
administration were even more unclear after 1939 than in the previous
years. And, although the government's measures in regard to military
priorities for war production became more and more noticeable to the
average citizen, the AUFBAU did not print sufficient information about
even the major war agencies. The war administration appeared as a
hydra-headed monster that talked in many tongues and took many shapes.
The AUFBAU therefore relied mainly on messages from President Roosevelt
himself and some of his major cabinet members to distinguish political
tendencies from administrative detail.
Just as in the pre-war years, then, the dominating forces of the
government were represented by President Roosevelt and those Cabinet
members who functioned as his personal aides. The AUFBAU 's nearly
absolute belief in the inherent righteousness of all presidential
decisions made most measures of the war administration immune to
criticism for the paper (except for the government's inclusion of
refugees in the "enemy alien" category) . But basic questions of world
politics did start lively discussions in the paper about such things as
the position of refugees and aliens in the United States, Roosevelt s
war strategy, and the policies of the American government toward postwar
„
4
Europe
.
The AUFBAU approved participation of political parties, unions,
4
Sep. 17, 43, p. e; March 31, 44, p. 2. For a discussion of
wartime
bureaucracy, see Richard Polenger, War and Society, New York 19 / 2 , pp.
193,194
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and other interest groups in the decisionmaking process of the war
government, if it took place without dissent from general administrative
policies. All forces which could potentially oppose the government
were seen as disturbing elements. The AUFBAU ' s fears of internal disruption
by these rivals of governmental power definitely surpassed those of
most Americans. This fact was partly due to the higher tension under
which the refugees lived during the war. But it also points toward
a basic insecurity that had its roots in the experiences of the Weimar
Republic
.
Less narrowed by fears and ideological blindness than the paper's
perspectives on domestic politics was its reporting about the war
economy and wartime society, especially as they reflected the refugees'
everyday life. Three topics that had a major impact on changing the
economic and social structure of the country held primary interest for
the AUFBAU and its readers: (1) the shortage of labor, (2) the shortage
of raw materials and goods for civilian production, (3) rising wages and
the resulting inflation. The paper dwelt on all these factors and their
interconnections at great length, along with their probable effects on
the postwar economy.
The change in the workingman's position during the war was a
development that affected the lives and perspectives of the refugees
most decisively. "Enemy aliens" had constituted a class of workers
that was strongly discriminated against until late 1942. But by that
time even older, untrained refugees no longer had difficulties in
finding jobs outside New York City. The AUFBAU, however, urged its
readers not to respond to the new situation by taking any kind of
job,
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but to look specifically for work in the defense industry. Yet many
war plants, in accordance with restrictive legislation, refused to hire
"enemy aliens" for fear that spies might be among them. Throughout
the war, the paper continually criticized this situation.'*
But even when a refugee did join the ranks of the well paid
defense workers he faced new kinds of hardships. He was joining a
huge migration of Americans, most of them formerly unemployed. These
newly recruited workers flocked into the boom towns throughout the
country where hastily erected temporary housing and often hostile towns-
people awaited them. These circumstances, as well as the prospect of
being unemployed after the war boom was over, did not offer the refugees
the stability which they greatly needed. For the most part, the AUFBAU
failed to mention these more somber aspects of work in defense industry,
but instead stressed the emotionally rewarding quality of such work.
The paper argued that in times of national emergency sacrifices were
6
necessary in order to maintain a high standard of war production.
Inflation was a problem that mainly hit those refugees who worked
in the lower paid white collar jobs. The paper reassured its readers
that the government was doing everything possible to curb inflation.
Wage ceilings in labor contracts, price freezes imposed by the war
administration on most consumer goods, and rationing of some essential
5
Jan. 2, 42, p. 2; Jan. 30, 42, p. 1; Feb. 27, 41, p. 1;
Sep. 25,
43, p. 4; Sep. 11, 43, p. 2.
6
Aug. 7, 42, p. 15; Nov. 13, 43, p. 12; Jan. 14, 44,
p. 9. On
conditions of wartime labor, see Richard Lingemann, Don t You
Know
There's a War On? New York 1970, ch. V.
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products were approved and considered effective by the AUFBAU. War
bonds, as the paper explained at one point, formed a useful device to
drain off excess consumer power, the root of many problems in the
7
wartime economy.
Problems relating to shortages of goods were of interest to the
readers. Because the women were seen as the main shoppers, most advice
relating to economical budget management appeared on the women's page.
Usually these features about what to buy and when, how to save scarce
materials and goods, and how to become more self sufficient even in
an urban environment were informative and precise. They paint an
excellent picture of the everyday lifestyle of many refugee households
during the war. The sudden consumer orientation of the AUFBAU was not
very different from what happened in American women's magazines at the
8
same time.
In the spotlight of the reports on refugees in the war effort were
those immigrants who most directly contributed to defeating the fascists,
refugees in the American armed forces. After Pearl Harbor, statements
in the AUFBAU gave the impression of a sudden rush of recent immigrants
from Germany to enlist in the armed forces. The accuracy of this obser-
vation is hard to check. A special desire to take an active part in
the war against the Nazis, as well as the benefits that army enlistment
brought for the refugees (they automatically became citizens after
serving three months) could have been strong forces motivating enlistment.
7May 22, 42, p. 24; May 29, 42, p. 16; July 31, 42, p. 31;
Oct 9, 42, p.
80ct . 9, 42, p. 21; Oct. 23, 42, p. 21; Nov. 6, 42, p. 21;
March 16,
43, p. 12; Sep. 11, 42, p. 4; Dec. 11, 42, p.
16.
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In any event, the paper was extremely proud of the new GI ' s and published
the names and photographs of the newly enlisted in every issue. Later,
notable events and observations about and by refugee soldiers were
regularly printed on a special page ("This is the Army").
9
Life as a soldier was usually seen as a highly rewarding and very
Americanizing experience. Mothers were assured many times that their
sons were well taken care of in the armed forces, and emphasis was
placed on the fact that life in the United States army had little in
common with the repressive rule under which German soldiers had
traditionally lived. Comradeship, a friendly atmosphere, and a sober
attitude towards the war were stressed as the special qualities of the
American armed forces. Some of the articles written by refugee soldiers
themselves clearly showed not so much sobriety as vengeful emotions
10
towards the enemy, especially the Germans.
The refugee boys in the army were pampered by a special organization
founded by some New World Club women, the "Our Boys Club". Its activities
consisted mainly of sending letters and packages to refugee GI's, many
of whom had no family in the United States. On holidays and free
weekends, the New World Club entertained those who were stationed in the
New York area. However marginal these activities seem today, they were
widely reported in the paper; the "Our Boys Club" even had its own page
9March 27, 42, p. 1; Jan. 9, 42, j. 4; Aug. 6, 43, p. 16.
10Sep. 25, 43, p. 3; Jan. 30, 42, p. 1 & p. 15; Jan. 2, 42, p. 3;
May 15, 42, p. 5; May 29, 42, p. 9; June 5, 42, p. 9; June 18, 42,
p. 4;
Aug. 20, 43, p. 1.
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in the AUFBAU for most of the war years.
But not every refugee could join the armed forces. Women soon
wanted to become members of the WACS or WAVES, which some were allowed
to do late in the war. Refugees living in the New York area were urged
to join the Civil Defense; but this was not always easy to do. The
roster of alien specialized personnel, a central clearing house for the
registration of alien professionals, encouraged AUFBAU readers to apply
for government service. Doctors, only reluctantly taken by the armed
forces, were advised to move to the countryside in order to offset the
12
shortage of doctors there.
As far as volunteer work was concerned, the refugees made consider-
able effort to prove that they were well aware of their special
responsibility to help win the war. The New World Club's "Victory
Volunteers" sold war bonds, the women's group knitted and sewed for
the army, special blood donation campaigns were organized, and, in
April 1942, a fundraising campaign was started to purchase a fighter
plane for the Air Force. Within a year the AUFBAU and other refugee
organizations succeeded in raising the necessary amount, the plane was
" 14
purchased, named "Loyalty," and dedicated in March 1943.
The refugees' financial support of the war was also expressed in
''’’'"Starts July 31, 43, p. 10.
12June 26, 42, p. 3; July 10, 43, p. 3; Jan. 27, 44, p. 5;
Aug. 13,
43, p. 28; Sep. 24, 43, p. 32.
13Dec.l2, 41, p. 21; Marchl3, 42, p. 9; July 24, 42, p.
7.
14
Apr. 3, 42, p. 2; Apr. 10, 42, p. 1;
Oct. 9, 42, p. 5; March 19,
43, p. 1; March 26, 43, pp. 15/16.
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war bond purchases which the paper promoted with considerable thunder.
Active participation in war bond campaigns as minutemen or minutewomen
was considered not only a patriotic duty but also an Americanizing
experience which would transmit the American patriotic spirit to the
refugees
.
^
For the refugees, the war on the homefront was not experienced very
differently than it was by most Americans. But in some ways the AUFBAU's
perception of wartime reality was definitely influenced, even distorted,
by the special situation of the refugees in this war. Thus the AUFBAU's
consciousness of what happened in Europe was extremely high and showed
in the overly frenzied attitude of many refugees who wanted to be more
patriotic than most Americans. The AUFBAU's portrait of war events was
so gripping, and the fears of most refugees about a possible Nazi
victory so suffocating, that almost no quiet or private life seemed
permissible or realizable for refugees who wanted to settle down and
establish a new permanent existence. The desire to organize one's own
life first had to be suspended for the duration of the war. The paper
felt that if, for this one last time, everybody would forget about his
individual needs and would invest his energies in winning the war, then
America's future and that of the refugees would be secure.
^ 5June 12, 42, pp. 3/4; June 26, 42, p. 7; Nov. 13, 42, p. 20.
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CONCLUSION
The German-Jewish refugees of the 1930s were certainly among the
most successful of all immigrant groups to come to America. Within one
generation they entered the American middle class, hardly distinguishable
as a separate immigrant group. One might ask: why this success story?
After all, the refugees, as others before them, had to begin completely
anew. Indeed, reports in the AUFBAU as well as from various refugee
agencies suggest that, as a rule, the refugees had to start from the
very bottom of the social and economic ladder and work their way up
only gradually. Yet, this impression is only part of the truth. In
actuality, the refugees can be considered to have been one of the most
priviledged immigrant groups in American history. Almost all of the
newcomers were middle class and well educated. Coming from Germany,
they had lived in a country which was in many ways similar to the
American social and economic system. Moreover, it can safely be assumed
that only the more flexible people, and those with foresight, personal
connections, and financial means, could effectively make use of the
limited ways to enter the United States. Many had friends, relatives,
or sponsors in the new country; and they had to pass the rigid screening
of United States consular officers abroad. Thus a highly selected
group entered the country between 1933 and 1945.
The major difficulties the refugees encountered after their arrival
in the United States were the result of their priviledged past. As most
of them had a highly qualified educational background, language barriers
and specialized skills were obstacles for their assimilation that would
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have been less had the new immigrants come from a working class back-
ground. But, even if the period of initial adjustment was longer and
more painful for middle class immigrants, once they had learned English
and added American know-how to their original skills they could join
the American middle class almost without difficulty.
Only the rather numerous intellectuals (teachers, scholars of the
humanities, scientists, and artists) followed a somewhat different
route from the main road of refugee assimilation. Much of their success
and influence had rested on their earlier reputations. They were
internationally known as members of a certain school of philosophy, or
of a field of the sciences, or simply as representatives of the German
intellectual community. They were so deeply rooted in German cultural
soil that any Americanization was impossible. More than for any other
refugees, their stay in America was merely an exile; and in fact many of
them returned to Germany or another European country after the war.
Middle class background alone is not sufficient explanation for
the swift and rather steady assimilation of the refugees. Why, for
example, did they never form a cohesive ethnic community among them-
selves, as had practically all immigrant groups before them? As
suggested earlier, the specific historical background of the Jews in
Germany and the circumstances of their emigration made it impossible
for them to perceive themselves as Germans and as Jews in any positive
terms. They looked upon themselves much more as middle class immigrants
than in any ethnic terms. Adherence to the language of their old home-
country, and strong religious affiliation, factors which could have
impelled the refugees into close association with other ethnic groups in
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American society, were of minor importance.
An accelerating factor in the integration of the refugees into
American society was the onset of World War II. As with any boom,
the war economy integrated disadvantaged minorities at least temporarily
into the labor force. Poor whites, and Blacks, along with many
refugees, could easily find jobs and move onto the first step toward a
respectable place in society. Unlike some other groups, refugees were
able to turn this initial chance into a starting point from which they
would attain more permanent positions as wage earners. Because of their
social and educational background they succeeded during the war in
changing their status from a needed group of workers to a wanted class
of immigrants.
The social integration of the refugees was expedited by the
psychological climate of the war. The ideology of national unity, and
the abandonment of the individual approach to the "pursuit of happiness"
in favor of a patriotic collectivism, created a favorable situation for
the immigrants. Anti-Semitism and anti-alienism were officially
denounced as un-patriotic . And cooperation with anti-fascist foreigners
was approved, providing the refugees with ample opportunity to prove
their loyalty to their new homecountry.
Last but not least, the fact that the refugees were considered to
be a special group of immigrants helped them in many ways. The refugees
were the first immigrants in American history who received comprehensive
and systematic assistance by special refugee aid agencies. Newcomers
were given financial assistance, were trained for new professions, and
were resettled into different parts of the country. The refugees
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approved the assimilation efforts of these agencies; and the success of
resettlement and retraining was considerable, although it varied
depending on the age, the sex, and the social background of the immigrants.
Refugee allegiance to the social and economic system of their
new country was unconditional. The immigrants from Germany believed
that America's social order provided everybody, most notably the new
immigrant, with an equal chance to reach a respected and secure position
in society. If one was willing to start a new life, the American dream
could become a reality. Not only was the rise from dishwasher to
millionaire possible; but, even more important, the menial worker had
equal rights and an equal dignity with the millionaire. Thus the
vision of an almost classless society in the United States emerged on
the pages of the AUFBAU, especially during the war years.
The war also made evident that the refugees' decided approval of
the American social order was not accompanied by an understanding of
the American political scene. The system was looked at, but never
looked into. But from what perspective could the refugees analyze
the American system? Certainly their experiences in the Third Reich
and in the Weimar Republic provided no background on which to base their
political judgement. Nor did the refugees want to criticize a country
which offered them a haven from persecution. A basic fear and a nagging
inferiority complex, caused by their uncertain emotional and political
position in the new land, largely accounted for their one dimensional
view and lack of criticism. Refugees had been an unwanted group of
immigrants throughout the thirties, and for some time their loud
proclamations of allegiance to the United States could barely drown
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the noise of anti-Semites and nativists.
Some of the refugees' blurred perspectives of American society
had their roots in misunderstanding of the American social system
from the viewpoint of middle class Germans. Thus the fact that ethnic
divisions cut deeply into American society, more so than class lines,
was frequently overlooked by the AUFBAU
.
In other instances the European attitudes of the AUFBAU ' s readers
produced feelings of superiority toward some aspects of American life.
The German immigrants were often critical of American culture, the
American family order, life in small towns, and American education.
Many refugees could not reconcile themselves to such aspects of
American life as married women holding jobs, children staying in school
for the whole day, or old and young Americans considering comic strips
as part of their daily newspaper reading. Could they ever get used to
this lifestyle, they asked themselves in the AUFBAU. One famous
refugee, Theodor W. Adorno, expressed his feelings about this situation
in an anecdote: I still remember the shock that a housemaid, an
emigrant like ourselves, gave me during our first days in New York
when she, the daughter of a so-called good home, explained: "people in
my town used to go to the symphony, now they go to Radio City." In no
way did I want to be like her.
1
The conflict between the ideals of the
upwardly mobile German bourgeois and their desire to be like the
Joneses remained largely unresolved within the first generation of new
^'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America," Bernard
Bailyn . and Donald Fleming, eds., The Intellectual Migration , Cambridge,
1969, p. 338.
139
immigrants
.
In this dilemma the AUFBAU played an important role for the new
immigrants. The paper reflected the refugees' perspectives on American
life and reassured them that the problems they had were common to many
other newcomers. When difficulties seemed to be insurmountable to the
individual refugees, the paper, and especially the New World Club,
proved helpful in many practical ways, giving information and assistance
concerning immigration, retraining, resettlement, and assimilation.
The AUFBAU also tried to lift the morale of its readers by printing
success stories of Americanized refugees, in order to reassure less
fortunate immigrants that the American dream was realizable.
An important function of the AUFBAU, then, was to provide
reassurance and stability. It tried to soften the cultural shock of
the immigrants from Germany and help in concrete ways with their
economic readjustment. For the refugees the AUFBAU was the surrogate for
a cohesive ethnic community which they could not build in a more complete
sense. This fact did not prevent the paper from truly serving the
Americanization of the immigrant. But it did this only in a very
indirect way. Neither the thunderous war patriotism nor the editorial
debates about Americanization helped the reader much. But numerous
smaller, neutral looking features in the paper, such as the "Wall
Street Telegram" the "Review of Labor," and "Frau Marianne's" advice
about careful shopping, accurately reflected the facts of daily life in
the United States. Through these minor features, the AUFBAU conveyed
the essential raw materials of acculturation. In reality, Americanization
of the refugee occurred mostly in the background of the paper, behind the
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official efforts toward that goal. The AUFBAU did succeed remarkably
well in its primary goal of Americanization, but the greatest part of
this success came through inadvertence.
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appendix
RULES FOR REFUGEES, ROYAL OR OTHERWISE, WHILE IN AMERICA
Refugees in America are on a spot. So are Americans who have volunteered
to take them in during their exile. Hence to promote international good-
will LIFE offers a few simple rules of behavior for visiting foreigners,
royal or otherwise, who don't bother about becoming a part of the U.S.
scene:
1. Refugees should remember that they are nothing special. Broadly
speaking, all U. S. citizens except Indians, who do not count, are
either refugees or descendants of refugees. Newcomers must take their
proper place.
2. Refugees should not write articles about the Collapse of France
or My Escape from Europe, cash checks on non-existent bank accounts, get
drunk in public until they know English, or insult U. S. girls. Some
American girls, unfortunately, are still susceptible to foreign accents.
3. Refugee youngsters, like those of the domestic variety, should be
seen and not heard. Small fry should work hard in school and not bother
their elders.
4. Celebrated refugees must learn U. S. manners and customs. They
should not suggest to natives that civilized people take three hours
for lunch, that what the U. S. needs is art and culture such as only
Europeans can contribute, and that Americans do not really know how to
live. They should also hold their public lecturing down to a
subsistence
minimum.
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5. Rich refugees should not demand maid service, special cooking and
personal automobiles from hosts who feel they are doing handsomely to
provide their guests with room and board. There are already along the
eastern seaboard of this country many refugees from refugees.
6. Refugees should remember that Americans' nerves are on edge. They
must not band together in little swarms, chattering and squealing in
their foreign bird-talk. They must mingle, calmly and happily, with
all and sundry, staying outdoors as much as possible.
7. At all costs, let those refugees and imitation refugees who insist
on sliding in the snow in Tyrolean costume stop yodeling.
8. Above all, refugees should be aware that Americans feel friendly
toward them and in their own way are trying to give them a decent break.
LIFE magazine, December 16, 1940, p. 91.


